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INTRODUCTION 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”1  Hardly a typical Memorial Day 
tribute, protesters chanted and carried signs displaying this and other 
offensive statements near the Arlington National Cemetery entrance.2  
Standing in a closed-off area across a four-lane road, a few members 
of the Westboro Baptist Church—unaffiliated with any mainstream 
Baptist church—presented incredibly deplorable views.3  They 
designed their demonstration to incite action, namely to reverse the 
United States’ tolerance of homosexuality.4  Although they succeeded 
in spurring action, Congress’s response worked against the 
protesters’ cause.  That day, as the small group picketed and crowds 
of people came to remember fallen service members, President Bush 
signed into law the Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act 
                                                          
 1. Associated Press, Anti-gay group protests at National Cemetery:  Church group stages 
Memorial Day demonstration, prompting opposition, MSNBC, May 29, 2006, http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/10663255/. 
 2. See id. (listing other slogans written on the signs, including “God is America’s 
terror,” “You’re going to hell,” and “Bush killed them,” and stating that the 
protesters also sang “God hates America” to the tune of “God Bless America”).  
 3. See id. (noting that, because a line of police cars and noisy traffic across a 
four-lane highway separated protesters and military supporters, the two groups could 
not hear each other, but held signs to express their views); Brian Goodman, Funeral 
Picketers Sued by Marine’s Dad, CBSNEWS.COM, July 28, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com 
/stories/2006/07/27/national/main1843396.shtml (stating that the Phelps family 
founded the Westboro Baptist Church in 1955, but that the Church has no affiliation 
with mainstream Baptist churches despite its name). 
 4. See Goodman, supra note 3, (“Our job . . . is to put this cup of his wrath and 
fury to the lips of this nation and make them drink it.” (quoting Shirley Phelps-
Roper, spokeswoman, Westboro Baptist Church)); see also Ann Rostow, Marine’s 
parents sue anti-gay Phelps clan, PLANETOUT NEWS, June 5, 2006, http://www. 
planetout.com/news/article.html?2006/06/05/5 (explaining that the Westboro 
Baptist Church’s leader, Rev. Fred Phelps, protests funerals because he believes that 
“God is punishing the United States for the country’s gay-friendly policies”). 
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(“RAFHA” or “the Act”),5 essentially prohibiting demonstrations 
within three hundred feet of any national cemetery, including 
Arlington.  Yet, even this could not discourage the Westboro Baptist 
Church from speaking out.  One month later, the group returned to 
protest twenty-five year-old Army First Lieutenant Forrest Ewens’s 
funeral.6  As grieving family and friends laid Lieutenant Ewens to rest, 
those protesters discounted his sacrifice as punishment for America’s 
policies regarding homosexuality.7 
While expression such as this is, to say the least, difficult to tolerate, 
especially by the families of fallen soldiers, First Amendment 
jurisprudence nonetheless requires that we permit such speech.  Last 
year’s RAFHA,8 however, restricts demonstrations on or near 
Arlington National Cemetery or any cemetery under the control of 
the National Cemetery Administration (“NCA”).9  This statute 
                                                          
 5. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (West 2006). 
 6. See WashingtonPost.com, Faces of the Fallen, http://projects.washingtonpost. 
com/fallen/dates/2006/jun/16/forrest-p-ewens/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (listing 
individual deceased soldiers and their age at time of death, hometown, cause of 
death, etc.); Goodman, supra note 3 (explaining that the Westboro Baptist Church 
has taken its “love crusades” to military funerals nationwide, including that of Lt. 
Ewens). 
 7. See Goodman, supra note 3 (explaining that the Church believes God is 
punishing America by killing soldiers because of this country’s tolerance of 
homosexuality). 
 8. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413.  The text of the Act reads in part: 
(a) Prohibition.  No person may carry out— 
(1) a demonstration on the property of a cemetery under the control of the 
National Cemetery Administration or on the property of Arlington National 
Cemetery unless the demonstration has been approved by the cemetery 
superintendent or the director of the property on which the cemetery is 
located; or 
(2) with respect to such a cemetery, a demonstration during the period 
beginning 60 minutes before and ending 60 minutes after a funeral, 
memorial service, or ceremony is held, any part of which demonstration — 
(A)(i) takes place within 150 feet of a road, pathway, or other route of 
ingress to or egress from such cemetery property; and 
(ii) includes, as part of such demonstration, any individual willfully making 
or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to 
disturb the peace or good order of the funeral, memorial service, or 
ceremony; or 
(B) is within 300 feet of such cemetery and impedes the access to or egress 
from such cemetery. 
 9. Id.  Although 38 C.F.R. § 1.218 (2006) and 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(f) (2006) set 
out quite similar rules of behavior explicitly prohibiting disturbing conduct and 
distributing pamphlets for all Veterans Affairs facilities, including those under the 
NCA’s control, and Arlington National Cemetery respectively, this Comment only 
assesses the constitutionality of RAFHA.  Moreover, this Comment does not address 
The Respect for the Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act, legislation that would go beyond 
RAFHA’s current limitations to ban protests at any military funeral, wherever it 
occurs.  See Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin’s Respect for the Funerals of Fallen 
Heroes Act Headed to President to be Signed Into Law (Dec. 11, 2006), available at 
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prohibits certain expression within 300 feet of the cemetery and 150 
feet of any road, pathway, or other route leading into the cemetery 
from one hour before until one hour after every funeral.10  Restricted 
conduct includes picketing, orating, and displaying flags when such 
expression is not part of the funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.11 
This Comment argues that RAFHA, as currently written, cannot 
stand in light of First Amendment jurisprudence.  Part I reviews the 
history and development of relevant free speech case law and 
restrictions on expression, including the recent trend in the states of 
passing legislation similar to RAFHA.  Part II assesses the Act’s 
constitutionality against this background.12  First, Part II contends that 
the statute is a content-based restriction of free speech and is thus 
subject to strict scrutiny.  Second, even if deemed content neutral, 
the Act could not survive the courts’ intermediate scrutiny.  Finally, 
this Comment reasons that even if able to survive the above 
challenges, the Act is still unconstitutional under First Amendment 
case law because it provides for standardless prior restraint.  This 
Comment concludes that RAFHA is an unconstitutional regulation of 
speech and should be challenged in court. 
                                                          
http://durbin.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=266834&&.  This Act was passed by both 
houses in early December 2006.  Id. 
 10. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a). 
 11. Id. § 2413(b)(1)-(3). 
 12. This Comment only examines the statute’s constitutionality within the 
purview of the First Amendment.  One might argue that the statute also violates 
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute does 
not give adequate guidance to those subject to the law and is thus overly vague. 
Readers interested in finding more on this issue are directed to Musser v. Utah, 333 
U.S. 95, 97 (1948) (“Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it 
fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law–abiding, to advise 
defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide 
courts in trying those who are accused.”), and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
Vague laws offend several important values.  First, because we assume that 
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warnings.  Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them.  A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory applications. 
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).  
CORNWELL.OFFTOPRINTER 6/2/2007  3:53:50 PM 
2007] A FINAL SALUTE TO LOST SOLDIERS 1333 
I. BACKGROUND:  FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS IN THE STATES 
RAFHA arrives against the background of a long history of First 
Amendment cases,13 as well as recent enactments of similar speech 
restrictions in quite a few states.14  The first section of Part I describes 
the relevant free speech jurisprudence, focusing on those issues that 
would reappear in a constitutional challenge of the Act.  The second 
section provides a brief study of similar state laws prohibiting speech 
near cemeteries and the lawsuits filed challenging those laws. 
A. Free Speech Jurisprudence:  A Review of Relevant Case Law 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress 
from making laws abridging the freedom of speech.15  In considering 
speech restrictions, the Supreme Court addresses several 
independent but related considerations.  To begin, the Court must 
identify in which forum the regulated speech would take place.16  
Next, the Court classifies the restriction as either content based or 
content neutral.17  Depending on this determination, the Court 
assesses the regulation’s constitutionality under either strict or 
intermediate scrutiny.18  The Court also considers whether the 
restriction grants unbridled discretion to a state official.19 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) (discussing content-
based speech restrictions); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 
772 (1988) (holding that laws providing for standardless prior restraint by 
government officials violate the First Amendment); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (identifying three types of forum relevant 
to speech restrictions under the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (asserting that certain speech, such as fighting words, is 
unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 14. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes 
similar to RAFHA). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16. See Robert D. Nauman, The Captive Audience Doctrine and Floating Buffer Zones:  
An Analysis of Hill v. Colorado, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 769, 774 (2002) (explaining that 
the Court identifies the forum, another consideration in the Court’s analysis, before 
deciding which standard of scrutiny to use); Alan Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer:  
Restricting Freedom of Expression Outside Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 280 (1999) 
(explaining that in cases of “relatively peaceful picketing, courts first pay attention to 
the location protesters choose to deliver their message rather than the message 
itself”). 
 17. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 770-76 (describing the Court’s traditional 
approach to restrictions of First Amendment rights, including first determining the 
forum, then the standard of scrutiny based on whether the law is content based or 
content neutral). 
 18. See id. at 774-76 (explaining that, in public fora, content-based laws are 
subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral laws receive intermediate scrutiny). 
 19. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 
(1988) (finding that because a content-based law that required newspapers to 
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1. Determining the forum 
Forum is a classification assigned to a certain location for purposes 
of assessing constitutional obligations under the First Amendment.20  
The Supreme Court recognizes the existence of three types of fora:  
the traditional public forum, designated public forum, and 
nonpublic forum.21  The Court characterizes the traditional public 
forum as one that has been immemorially reserved for public use, 
including citizens’ assembly, communication, and discussion.22  This 
includes places such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, which may never 
be closed by the government to all public discourse.23  A designated 
public forum, on the other hand, is one that has not traditionally 
served these purposes, but instead has been opened by the 
government to the public for assembly and expression.24  Examples of 
the designated public forum include school board meetings25 and 
municipal theaters.26  The government may silence public speech and 
expression in a designated public forum, but not in a traditional 
public forum.27  In these two types of public fora, content-based 
                                                          
continually reapply for a periodic license would logically result in self-censorship, it 
was facially unconstitutional). 
 20. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 774 (explaining that the level of expression 
allowed in a particular forum, and thus the amount of leeway given to the 
government, depends on the nature of the forum) (citations omitted). 
 21. See id. at 774-75 (discussing the forum analysis in Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)). 
 22. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (explaining 
that a traditional public forum has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of 
the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”); 
Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (defining a traditional public forum as “a forum 
devoted to assembly and debate by tradition” and supporting his statement with the 
above quotation from Hague). 
 23. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (noting that this characteristic truly 
distinguishes a traditional public forum from the other two types of fora) (citing 
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515). 
 24. See infra notes 134-135 and accompanying text (explaining that if the 
government elects to allow public access to the property, it takes on the same 
qualities as a traditional public forum). 
 25. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisc. Employment Relations 
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-77 (1976) (holding that school board meetings are 
designated public fora, in part because these are public meetings and decreeing the 
meetings to be nonpublic would essentially eliminate communication between 
teachers and their government). 
 26. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (finding 
that a municipal theater was a public forum because it was “designed for and 
dedicated to expressive activities”). 
 27. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (finding that the principal difference 
between a designated public forum and traditional public forum is that the 
government may limit speech and expression in the former, but not in the latter). 
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restrictions would be subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral 
restrictions need only meet intermediate scrutiny.28 
In a nonpublic forum, on the other hand, speech restrictions are 
subject to mere rational basis review and must not intend to silence 
only one opinion.29  This is because nonpublic fora, such as prisons,30 
military bases,31 and school mail systems,32 are closed to public 
communication.33 
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has never addressed 
the issue of forum as it applies to municipal cemeteries,34 several 
lower courts have attempted to do so and all classified cemeteries as 
nonpublic fora.35  In Warner v. City of Boca Raton,36 the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida found that “it seems quite 
obvious that cemeteries are nonpublic fora” since, above all, they are 
a place for citizens to bury and respect the dead, not to promote 
public debate.37  In Griffin v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,38 the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit relied on Warner, assuming for 
purposes of that case that Veterans Affairs cemeteries are nonpublic 
                                                          
 28. See id. (explaining that in nonpublic fora, content-based restrictions face a 
low standard of scrutiny since the government has considerable leeway in restricting 
speech, but in public fora, content-based restrictions face strict scrutiny, while 
content-neutral restrictions face intermediate scrutiny) (citations omitted). 
 29. See id. at 775-76 (describing a nonpublic forum as one that is not required to 
allow free public communication and explaining that in order to survive there, a 
speech restriction must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest, 
though it cannot be content based) (citations omitted). 
 30. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 44-48 (1966) (holding that a sheriff 
lawfully arrested members of a student assembly at a county jail because the property 
was closed to the public and the crowd’s removal served a security purpose). 
 31. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (holding that military bases 
are nonpublic fora because their essential function of providing common defense for 
the nation depends on the commanding officer’s power to exclude civilians). 
 32. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) 
(holding that a school mail system is a nonpublic forum because it is not open to the 
general public, but intended for intraschool communication, despite unaffiliated 
organizations’ sporadic use of the system). 
 33. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775-76 (explaining that, even though the 
government controls nonpublic fora, it is not obligated to allow free speech there) 
(citation omitted). 
 34. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
(admitting that the court was unaware of any precedential case identifying a 
municipal cemetery’s forum). 
 35. See Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(assuming that cemeteries owned by the Department of Veterans Affairs are 
nonpublic fora for purposes of the court’s First Amendment analysis because of the 
parties’ stipulation); Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (identifying a public cemetery as 
a nonpublic forum). 
 36. 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272. 
 37. Id. at 1291. 
 38. 288 F.3d 1309. 
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fora.39  Finally, in Koehl v. Resor,40 the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia did not classify the cemetery but held that 
“[a] national cemetery is a public place so clearly committed to other 
purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous.”41  
Whereas the district courts used strong, unsupported language such 
as “clearly” and “obvious” to support their classification,42 the court of 
appeals seemed to hesitate, resting its assumption on the fact that 
neither party disputed the classification or presented evidence to the 
contrary.43  As addressed in these cases, the issue of forum is hardly 
resolved with regard to municipal cemeteries. 
2. Determining whether the restriction is a content-based or content-neutral 
time, place, and manner restriction 
Depending on a statute’s language, courts apply either strict or 
intermediate scrutiny.44  Where a regulation explicitly distinguishes 
between favored and disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed, 
courts nearly always find the regulation content based.45  Sometimes, 
however, statutes are not overtly biased, but discriminate among 
messages under a veil of seemingly neutral language.46  Therefore, 
courts also look to legislative history and ask whether the restriction 
applies equally to all protesters regardless of viewpoint.47  In 
                                                          
 39. See id. at 1322 (finding that where no party challenged the forum 
classification, the court could accept the stipulated classification). 
 40. 296 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Va. 1969). 
 41. Id. at 562 (emphasis added). 
 42. Supra notes 37, 41 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1322 (explaining that both the parties and other courts 
agreed that public cemeteries are nonpublic fora). 
 44. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) 
If the State’s regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent 
standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of 
noncommunicative conduct controls . . . .  If it is, then we are outside of 
O’Brien’s test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson’s 
conviction under a more demanding standard. 
(citations omitted). 
See also Nauman, supra note 16, at 772-73 (identifying the different standards of 
review for each type of speech).  The Court has admitted that determining the 
content neutrality of a speech restriction can sometimes be difficult.  See Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular 
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”). 
 45. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 643 (adding that, in contrast, a law that 
burdens or benefits speech without regard to the expressed ideas is almost always 
content neutral). 
 46. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 
(1981) (distinguishing the first-come, first-served restriction in controversy from 
covertly content-based restrictions on the grounds that this restriction left no 
opportunity for suppressing a particular viewpoint). 
 47. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000) (relying on legislative history 
to support the conclusion that the regulation there was not adopted “because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
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determining whether a regulation is content based or content 
neutral, then, the Court’s inquiry is driven by the governmental 
purpose in creating the regulation.48 
The Court asks “whether the government has adopted a regulation 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”49  
Even if a regulation affects only certain speakers, the Court will 
nonetheless deem it content neutral where it serves a purpose 
unrelated to the content of the expression.50  In Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, the Supreme Court found that controlling noise levels at 
music events to avoid excessively disturbing other park and 
residential areas was “justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.”51  However, in Boos v. Barry,52 the Court deemed a 
regulation prohibiting the display of signs critical of foreign 
governments near their embassies a content-based restriction on 
political speech because it forbade only one type of speech, while 
permitting all others.53  Relying on Boos in Texas v. Johnson,54 the Court 
likewise found a regulation banning flag desecration to be content 
based, as it restricted political expression because of the content of 
the protester’s message.55  There, the law criminalized burning a flag 
in protest, but did not regulate burning a flag to respectfully dispose 
of it according to tradition.56 
Once the Court has determined whether or not the regulation is 
content based, it continues its analysis by applying the appropriate 
                                                          
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (explaining that a 
content-based purpose is sometimes sufficient to demonstrate that the regulation is 
content based, but is not always required); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 325 (1988) 
(supporting the Court’s finding that a regulation was content neutral with legislative 
history that illustrated the legislature’s concern with the restriction’s effect on free 
speech).  But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar 
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive . . . .  Inquiries 
into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.”). 
 48. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (“The government’s purpose is the 
controlling consideration.”). 
 49. Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 
(1984)); see Nauman, supra note 16, at 773 (identifying this question as “the principal 
inquiry as to whether a regulation is content based”). 
 50. Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)). 
 51. Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293) (internal 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 52. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 53. See id. at 318-19 (noting that the regulation permitted “[o]ther categories of 
speech . . . such as favorable speech about a foreign government or speech 
concerning a labor dispute with a foreign government”). 
 54. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 55. See id. at 411-12 (explaining that because the restriction on expression was 
content based, it must be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 56. See id. at 411 (suggesting that, had the defendant burned the flag in order to 
dispose of it because it was soiled or ripped, he never would have been prosecuted). 
CORNWELL.OFFTOPRINTER 6/2/2007  3:53:50 PM 
1338 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:5 
standard of scrutiny.  In public fora, content-based restrictions are 
assessed using strict scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions 
receive the Court’s intermediate scrutiny.57  To survive strict scrutiny, 
a regulation of speech must be a necessary means for serving a 
compelling state interest.58  To survive intermediate scrutiny, the 
regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest59 while leaving open ample alternative channels 
of expression.60 
a. Content-based restrictions 
Where the government has regulated speech simply because it 
disagrees with the speaker’s message, the Supreme Court finds that 
restriction to be content based.61  The Court presumes that content-
based regulations are invalid because the government cannot simply 
grant some, but deny others, the use of a public forum based on 
whose views it finds acceptable and whose expression it deems 
controversial.62  Nevertheless, the Court has found some forms of 
expression, such as “fighting words” and obscenity, to be unprotected 
under the First Amendment.63  This is because the Court considers 
that such expression has no social value, or merely communicates an 
intent to commit a violent and unlawful act.64  For example, the 
government may regulate fighting words to avoid a breach of the 
peace where such expression is:  (1) directed at an individual or small 
                                                          
 57. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775-76 (describing the three types of fora and 
explaining that in the first two, both within the public realm, the Court applies strict 
scrutiny to content-based regulations and intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral 
ones, whereas in a nonpublic forum, the Court applies a single, rational basis 
standard). 
 58. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (articulating this strict standard). 
 59. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-800 (1989) (finding that 
the city’s concern over preventing excessive noise was effectively achieved through a 
regulation requiring a city sound technician). 
 60. Id. at 791. 
 61. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s 
inquiry into the government’s purpose when analyzing free speech restrictions). 
 62. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based 
regulations are presumptively invalid.”) (citations omitted); Police Dep’t of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (explaining that because “[t]he essence of . . . 
forbidden censorship is content control” government may not grant or deny the use 
of a forum based on the content of speech). 
 63. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (establishing a three-
pronged test for determining whether material is “obscene” and therefore 
unprotected under the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571-74 (1942) (holding that fighting words, which incite a breach of the peace, 
have hardly any social value and thus are unprotected under the First Amendment). 
 64. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (discussing the different 
types of expressive conduct proscribable under the First Amendment, including 
fighting words and true threats). 
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group; (2) inherently likely to invoke a violent response; and (3) “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas.”65  Likewise, certain 
regulations allowing harsher sentencing for hate crimes do not 
violate the First Amendment because they primarily serve to regulate 
conduct, not speech.66  Statutes regulating unprotected speech are 
therefore permitted to be content based. 
In applying the most “exacting scrutiny”67 to content-based 
regulations of protected speech, the Court asks whether the 
government has proven that the restriction is a necessary means for 
achieving a compelling state interest.68  The Court has found that 
having an undisrupted school session conducive to students’ 
learning69 and maintaining public safety70 qualify as compelling state 
interests.  Nonetheless, it is quite rare that a state interest is deemed 
sufficiently compelling to justify a content-based regulation of 
speech.71 
Finally, the Court considers whether the regulation is sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest.72  
Often, courts look to another factor—whether less restrictive 
alternatives exist—to determine whether a regulation is narrowly 
                                                          
 65. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 574 (defining fighting words as those “epithets 
likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the 
peace”); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (finding that vulgar language 
on a jacket did not constitute fighting words because the words were not directed at a 
particular individual nor displayed to intentionally provoke a violent reaction). 
 66. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484-88 (1993) (holding that a statute 
providing for enhanced punishment for race-based hate crimes was constitutional 
since it was a regulation of physical conduct, namely assault, which is neither 
expressive nor protected under the First Amendment); cf. Black, 538 U.S. at 363 
(holding that a law prohibiting cross-burning was constitutional because such 
conduct was a form of intimidation meant to threaten violence and thus unprotected 
under the First Amendment).  But cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding an ordinance 
outlawing certain symbolic actions, including cross-burning, viewpoint specific and 
thus unconstitutional because it only punished such conduct when based on the 
disfavored subjects of “race, color, creed, religion or gender”). 
 67. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
 68. See id. (citing a string of cases for the proposition that the state must show 
that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))); Nauman, supra note 16, at 773 (“The 
government then must prove that the means are necessary to achieve a compelling 
state interest in order for the restriction to survive.”). 
 69. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding an anti-
noise ordinance prohibiting disruptive protests and picketing near school grounds). 
 70. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (upholding a law prohibiting offensive or 
annoying language in public since such “fighting words” would lead to a breach of 
the peace, something the government has a compelling interest in preventing). 
 71. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that the strict scrutiny standard is often fatal). 
 72. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (addressing whether the law in question serves a 
compelling governmental interest after having decided that the law applied in a 
public forum, was content based, and was thus subject to strict scrutiny review). 
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tailored.73  In Boos, the Court assumed that there was a sufficiently 
compelling interest in restricting political speech on streets 
surrounding embassies and consulates, yet still found the regulation 
facially invalid because it was not narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.74  The Boos Court looked to a similar, less restrictive District 
of Columbia law to demonstrate that such alternatives exist, thus 
invalidating the federal statute.75 
b. Content-neutral restrictions 
Despite the strict protections afforded speech in public fora, one’s 
right to free speech is not totally without limitation.  The Court has 
repeatedly held that, even in a public forum, the government may 
restrict expression in time, place, or manner, so long as the 
restrictions are unrelated to the content of the expression and pass 
intermediate scrutiny.76 
First, the Court inquires whether the restrictions are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.77  The Court has 
held that the government has a substantial interest in protecting its 
citizens from unwelcome noise in their homes78 and physical or 
emotional harm when seeking medical care.79  To be considered 
narrowly tailored, the regulation must “promote[] a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.”80  In Rock Against Racism, the Court found that the 
government interest in controlling noise levels was directly and 
                                                          
 73. See id. at 324-27 (comparing the District of Columbia law with an analogous, 
less restrictive federal law and holding that the federal law’s existence and legislative 
history supported a finding that the governmental interest in the District of 
Columbia law was insufficiently compelling). 
 74. See id. (holding that because Congress enacted a less restrictive federal 
speech regulation, but then imposed a more restrictive regulation in Washington, 
D.C., the restriction was not narrowly tailored). 
 75. See id. at 325-27 (comparing the federal statute with the District of Columbia 
law). 
 76. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (explaining the 
requirements of such time, place, and manner regulations, as well as the 
considerations of intermediate scrutiny). 
 77. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (listing the factors of an intermediate 
scrutiny analysis). 
 78. See id. at 796 (explaining that such an interest is valid because it closely 
relates to maintaining parks as in Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296, 
and protecting tranquility and privacy at home as in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 
484 (1988)). 
 79. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-18 (2000) (finding that by offering this 
protection, the state maintains unobstructed access to health clinics). 
 80. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). 
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effectively served by the requirement that the city’s own sound 
technician handle the volume controls.81 
Likewise, in certain picketing cases, the Court has deemed “buffer 
zones” narrowly tailored where the distance was reasonable.82  A 
buffer zone can be either fixed or floating.  In Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of Western New York,83 the Court deemed reasonable a fixed 
buffer zone prohibiting demonstrations within fifteen feet of 
abortion clinic entrances.84  In Hill v. Colorado,85 the Court found that 
a floating buffer zone, requiring picketers within one hundred feet of 
an abortion clinic to keep a minimum eight-foot distance from 
patients entering the clinic, was narrowly tailored to serve the state 
interest in protecting privacy and access to medical facilities.86 
Finally, the Court asks whether the restrictions leave open ample 
alternative channels of expression.87  This does not, however, mean 
that the alternatives must be the least restrictive or least intrusive 
means of restricting speech.88  In Frisby v. Schultz,89 the Court found 
that an ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of someone’s home 
nonetheless left ample alternative channels for communication, such 
as going door-to-door, marching through the neighborhoods, and 
contacting residents by phone or mail.90 
3. Standardless prior restraint 
A prior restraint is not unconstitutional per se, but where no 
standards regulate such discretion, there is a heavy presumption of 
unconstitutionality.91  The Court has repeatedly invalidated licensing 
statutes entrusting government officials with standardless discretion 
                                                          
 81. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 801 (finding that without the requirement 
the city would have received many complaints, thus disserving the government’s 
interest). 
 82. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27, 729 (comparing the eight-foot buffer zone in that 
case to the fifteen-foot zone in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 
519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997), and finding that the regulation was “an exceedingly 
modest restriction on the speakers’ ability to approach”). 
 83. 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 84. Id. at 380-81; see also Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
581, 600-01 (2006) (explaining that although the Court invalidated the floating 
buffer zone for being overly broad, it upheld the fixed buffer zone). 
 85. 530 U.S. 703. 
 86. See id. at 719-20 (upholding the restriction because, in addition to being 
narrowly tailored, it also was content neutral and regulated action, not speech). 
 87. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 88. Hill, 530 U.S. at 726 (citation omitted). 
 89. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
 90. See id. at 484 (agreeing with appellants that such alternatives were sufficient). 
 91. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (explaining that 
in order to prove the constitutionality of a prior restraint, the government bears the 
burden of showing that certain safeguards are present). 
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over whether to permit or deny expressive conduct out of fear that 
such discretion may result in censorship.92  In City of Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Publishing Co.,93 the Court provided several reasons for 
prohibiting such unbridled discretion.  First, because citizens are 
unsure whether the official will grant them the right to disperse their 
message, permitting standardless discretion encourages self-
censorship.94  If exercise of discretion is standardized, the Court 
suggests, the added certainty would eliminate self-censorship.95  
Second, without standards, it is difficult to distinguish between 
legitimate reasons for denial and biased applications of the law.96  
Finally, challenging an illegitimate denial is difficult and timely and 
thus likely would discourage challenges to the licensor’s discretion.97 
To prevent such abuses, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
standardless prior restraint, but has approached content-based and 
content-neutral regulations differently.98  For content-based 
regulations of speech, the Court applies a three-pronged test to the 
prior restraint provision:  (1) the restraint can only be imposed for a 
specified brief period so as to preserve the status quo; (2) the law 
must guarantee prompt and final judicial determination; and (3) the 
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the 
expression is unprotected must fall on the official.99  Content-neutral 
regulations containing prior restraint provisions, on the other hand, 
must only contain sufficient standards to guide the official’s decision 
and provide for judicial review.100 
                                                          
 92. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-57 (1988) 
(explaining that the Court has consistently granted standing to anyone subject to a 
law where prior restraint is permitted, even if they have not attempted to obtain a 
license). 
 93. 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
 94. See id. at 757-58 (asserting that standards prevent self-censorship by limiting 
discretion). 
 95. See id. at 757 (elaborating that “unfettered discretion, coupled with the power 
of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the 
discretion and power are never actually abused”). 
 96. See id. at 758 (finding that without standards, licensors can create post hoc 
rationalizations to justify their decision for denying a license). 
 97. See id. at 758-59 (explaining that difficulties of proof and case-by-case 
examinations required in such lawsuits leave the speaker’s message unheard and 
make the licensor’s action impossible to review). 
 98. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321-23 (2002) (holding that 
content-based regulations, but not content-neutral regulations, are required to meet 
procedural safeguards). 
 99. See id. at 321 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52, 57 (1965)) 
(listing the three safeguards developed in Freedman, a case involving a prior restraint 
on film licensing); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975) 
(reaffirming the Freedman safeguards). 
 100. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (explaining that time, place, and manner 
regulations are held to a lower standard). 
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While the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue in the 
context of cemetery rules, two lower courts have.  Although both 
courts treated the municipal cemeteries as nonpublic fora, each 
adopted a different approach in analyzing the issue of prior 
restraint.101  In Warner v. City of Boca Raton,102 the Southern District of 
Florida found unconstitutional a regulation permitting the cemetery 
manager to make standardless exceptions to any cemetery rule.103  On 
the other hand, in Griffin v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,104 the Federal 
Circuit held that undefined discretion vested in the superintendent 
of Arlington National Cemetery was constitutional for two reasons.  
First, the court reasoned that the presumption of unconstitutionality 
is weaker in nonpublic fora and, since municipal cemeteries are 
nonpublic fora, the regulations sufficiently rebutted the lower 
standard.105  Second, the court asserted that, in light of the nature 
and function of the cemetery, vesting standardless discretion in the 
facility head was reasonable.106 
B. Legislation and Litigation:  The Recent Trend in States 
Some states have long had laws regulating activity at funerals to 
ensure a respectful burial for the deceased and a peaceful place to 
mourn for the deceased’s friends and family.107  As the Westboro 
Baptist Church began picketing military funerals with signs praising 
the deaths of fallen soldiers, however, states responded with more 
stringent regulations.  By the end of May 2006, at least thirteen states 
                                                          
 101. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text (reviewing lower courts’ 
decisions and reasoning for finding cemeteries to be nonpublic fora). 
 102. 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 103. See id. at 1292-93 (holding that a regulation prohibiting vertical grave 
decorations except upon approval from the cemetery manager was standardless and 
provided opportunity for discrimination between speech, thus violating the First 
Amendment). 
 104. 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 105. See id. at 1322-23 (asserting that, by its terms, the prior restraint doctrine does 
not apply to nonpublic fora). 
 106. See id. at 1324 (finding that national cemeteries were established by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to serve as “national shrines . . . to our gallant dead” 
and for the government’s own expressive purposes). 
 107. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 594.35(d) (2006) (prohibiting 
“[d]isturb[ing], obstruct[ing], detain[ing] or interfer[ing] with any person carrying 
or accompanying human remains to a cemetery or funeral establishment, or engaged 
in a funeral service, or an interment”); CAL. SENATE COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, 2000 BILL 
SUMMARY:  MEASURES SIGNED AND VETOED, S. 1999-2000, 1059-S, at 120 (2000), 
available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/sen/committee/standing/publicsafety/bills/ 
billsummary2000.pdf (explaining that section 594.35 would replace a health and 
safety regulation prohibiting certain acts of destruction and vandalism to 
cemeteries). 
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had passed laws similar to the more restrictive RAFHA,108 while many 
others were considering such laws.109  In fact, RAFHA encouraged 
states to pass similarly strict laws,110 and since President Bush signed 
the bill into law in May 2006, several states have done just that.111 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has initiated 
lawsuits challenging the Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky laws.112  The 
ACLU brought all three lawsuits on similar bases, so examining only 
the Kentucky law and corresponding lawsuit provides an adequate 
look at the challenges’ foundations.113  The Kentucky law creates a 
                                                          
 108. See Associated Press, Blagojevich Signs Funeral Protest Bill, CBS2CHICAGO.COM, 
May 17, 2006, http://cbs2chicago.com/local/local_story_137154351.html (reporting 
that Illinois enacted a law similar to RAFHA in mid-May 2006); Ronald K.L. Collins & 
David L. Hudson, Jr., A Funeral for Free Speech?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at 66 
(noting that as of April 2006, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin had passed such laws); Ashley 
Rowland, Protesters to picket soldier’s funeral, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Sept. 23, 
2006 (comparing the Tennessee law passed in spring 2006 with the challenged 
Kentucky law); Press Release, Minn. State Rep. Philip Krinkie, Legislative Update 
from Rep. Phil Krinkie, May 17, 2006, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/members/ 
pressreleasels84.asp?district=53A&pressid=1404&party=2 (reporting that Minnesota 
Governor Pawlenty signed a bill similar to RAFHA into law in mid-May 2006); Press 
Release, SEIU Michigan State Council, Under the Dome Capitol Update, Feb. 10-
May 24, 2006, http://www.seiumi.org/news/press.cfm?pressReseaseID=1842 (choose 
year “2006” then follow “Under the Dome May 25, 2006” hyperlink) (reporting that 
this bill was signed into law on May 24, 2006). 
 109. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (claiming that in April of 2006 
at least twenty states were considering such laws). 
 110. H.R. 5037, 109th Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 2006) (“It is the sense of Congress that 
each State should enact legislation to restrict demonstrations near any military 
funeral.”). 
 111. See, e.g., South Carolina Legislature Online, H.4965, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. 
(S.C. 2006), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/cgibin/web_bh10.exe?bill1=49 
65&session=116&summary=T (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (reporting that, even after 
the governor vetoed the bill, the legislature overwhelmingly succeeded in overriding 
the veto in June 2006); Michael Sangiacomo, Legislators go to court to back Rest in Peace 
Act, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 12, 2006, at B10 (reporting that the Ohio 
governor signed the Rest in Peace Act into law on September 4, 2006).  Kansas, the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s home state, recently passed a similar law in April 2007.  
See Associated Press, Kansas governor signs legislation against anti-gay picketing at soldiers’ 
funerals, IHT.COM, Apr. 12, 2007,http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/12/ 
America/NA-GEN-US-Funeral-Picketing.php# (reporting that the law prohibits 
protesting within 150 feet of a funeral during, or for one hour before or two hours 
after, the ceremony).  Fearful that the WBC would challenge the law’s 
constitutionality, however, the legislature stipulated that the law will not take effect 
until the state supreme court or a federal court deems the law constitutional.  Id. 
 112. Complaint, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL (W.D. Mo. 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu-em.org/downloads/PhelpsCOMPLAINTFINAL.pdf; 
Complaint, McQueary v. Stumbo, No. 3:06-CV-00024 (E.D. Ky. 2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file568_25439.pdf; Sangiacomo, supra 
note 111, at B10 (reporting that the ACLU of Ohio filed suit within several days of 
enactment of the law). 
 113. See Sangiacomo, supra note 111 (reporting that the ACLU is challenging the 
law on grounds of overbreadth); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of 
Eastern Missouri, Funeral Protest Challenge, http://www.aclu-em.org/pressroom/20 
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300-foot radius around any funeral, funeral procession, memorial 
service, or ceremony within which congregating, picketing, and 
demonstrating are completely prohibited.114  Additionally, unless the 
deceased’s family or the person conducting the service approve, the 
statute prohibits activities such as singing, whistling, using sound 
amplification equipment, and displaying images within earshot or 
eyesight of participants in the service.115  The ACLU of Kentucky, 
representing a Kentucky resident and Westboro Baptist Church 
supporter, is challenging that state’s law on several grounds, 
including its overbreadth and provision permitting standardless prior 
restraint.116  On September 26, 2006, the district court judge issued a 
preliminary injunction suspending the law’s enforcement so as to 
avoid irreparable injury to the plaintiff during the trial.117  The court 
found that the law was content neutral and served a significant 
governmental interest, but was not narrowly tailored.118 
                                                          
06pressreleases/72106acluchallengeslawbann.htm (reporting that the ACLU of 
Eastern Missouri had filed suit for Shirley Phelps-Roper, the Westboro Baptist 
Church’s spokeswoman, against the Missouri Governor and Attorney General, as well 
as the county’s prosecuting attorney on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness and 
asserting that the law is content based and does not serve a valid government 
interest); Kentucky:  A.C.L.U. Backs Pickets at Funerals, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A16 
(reporting that the ACLU filed suit to challenge the law in part for its overbreadth). 
 114. See H.B. 333 § 5(1)(b), 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006). 
 115. See H.B. 333 § 5(1)(c), 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006). 
 116. Complaint, McQueary v. Stumbo, No. 3:06-CV-00024 (E.D. Ky. 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file568_25439.pdf.  First, the 
plaintiff alleged that the law is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and a 
content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest.  Id. at 4.  Second, he claimed that the statute contains 
“overbroad criminalizations of speech” because the radius is too large and the law 
criminalizes more speech than needed to avoid disruption to the funeral service.  Id. 
at 1, 5 (noting that simply entering onto land or congregating within three hundred 
feet of a funeral would hardly disrupt the service, yet such activity would be punished 
under the law).  Third, the plaintiff claimed that it is impermissible for a private 
party to have the authority to permit certain speech and expression, while denying 
others, on public property.  Id. at 5.  Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the law is 
overbroad “in that it forbids singing, chanting, or displaying images on public 
property, even if not disruptive, simply because it occurs within earshot or eyesight of 
funeral participants.”  Id.; see H.B. 333 § 5(1)(c)(1).  At the time this Comment was 
completed, none of the three courts had reached a final result. 
 117. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 997-98 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order 
granting preliminary injunction) (finding that while the injunction would serve the 
public interest and not cause substantial injury to others, it would cause irreparable 
injury to the plaintiff). 
 118. See id. at 992, 997 (holding that the law is unconstitutionally overbroad 
because, although it was content neutral and served the state’s legitimate interest in 
prohibiting interference with funerals, it restricted more speech than necessary). 
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II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESPECT FOR AMERICA’S 
FALLEN HEROES ACT 
RAFHA is unconstitutional under the First Amendment for several 
reasons.  First, it is viewpoint specific and discriminates between 
speech based on content.  As noted above, content-based regulation 
of speech is presumptively invalid119 and would not pass strict scrutiny.  
Second, even if deemed content neutral and thus assessed under 
intermediate scrutiny, the Act could not stand constitutional muster 
because it is not narrowly tailored, does not serve a government 
interest and does not leave ample alternative means for expression.  
Finally, even if the statute survives intermediate scrutiny, it 
nevertheless provides for standardless prior restraint,120 which is 
constitutionally impermissible under First Amendment 
jurisprudence.121 
A. The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act Restricts Speech Occurring in 
Both Designated and Traditional Public Fora 
The Supreme Court’s first step in analyzing any speech-restricting 
statute is to determine which of the three fora the regulation 
addresses.122  Here, the statute regulates speech both on cemetery 
property123 and any roads, paths, and routes of ingress and egress.124  
More importantly, though, the statute also reaches any place located 
within a 300-foot radius of the cemetery125 or a 150-foot radius of any 
roadways or paths leading to the cemetery, including public roads 
and sidewalks.126  While forum jurisprudence in lower courts indicates 
that cemeteries are nonpublic fora, the Supreme Court has yet to 
                                                          
 119. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that, because under the 
First Amendment the government cannot distinguish between favored and 
disfavored speech, speech regulations based on the content of expression are 
presumptively invalid). 
 120. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1) (West 2006) (“[U]nless the demonstration has 
been approved by the cemetery superintendent or the director of the property on 
which the cemetery is located . . . .”). 
 121. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (explaining that there exists a 
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality for statutes providing for standardless prior 
restraint and outlining the different tests for determining whether the presumption 
is supported). 
 122. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 774 (noting that, because the standard of 
scrutiny to be applied depends on the type of forum, forum must be considered 
first). 
 123. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1) (West 2006). 
 124. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(B). 
 125. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 126. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(B). 
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address the question.127  The Court likely would find that the 
cemetery property is a designated public forum, while the other areas 
fall within the first Perry category, the traditional public forum, since 
they have customarily been places of public discussion and 
expression.128  Since both areas are within the public forum, speech 
regulations applied there will be subject to the same level of 
scrutiny.129   
First, the cemetery property, including the roads and paths 
thereon, should be deemed a designated public forum.130  As defined 
in Perry, a designated public forum is property that the state owns and 
has opened for expressive activity by the public.131  Cemeteries, long 
used in the United States and throughout the world for people to 
gather and express their sentiments, fit within this definition.132  
                                                          
 127. See supra notes 34, 36-41 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning of 
two courts, one district and one circuit, in holding that municipal cemeteries are 
nonpublic fora). 
 128. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (finding that public streets and 
sidewalks are traditional public fora because they have been used immemorially for 
assembly of and communication among citizens). 
 129. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (concluding that the same constitutional 
protections apply in a designated public forum opened by the government for public 
expression as in a traditional public forum); see also supra note 28 and accompanying 
text (explaining that in public fora, content-based restrictions are subject to strict 
scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions are subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
 130. There is even an argument, albeit a weak one, that cemetery property could 
be deemed a traditional public forum.  For more on this, see Edward J. Neveril, 
“Objective” Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine:  The First Amendment at the Mercy of 
Architectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1185, 1238-39 (1996) (examining Justice 
Kennedy’s suggestion in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 
U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) to define objective 
physical characteristics demonstrative of a traditional public forum).  Justice 
Kennedy based his approach on “whether the property shares physical similarities 
with more traditional public forums.”  Id. at 1239 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 698-99).  Neveril’s comment argues that 
[T]he Arlington National Cemetery would appear to have many of the same 
physical qualities as the typical public park.  It is wide-open, largely covered 
with greenery, and transected by a maze of sidewalks.  Objective use is similar 
as well . . . .  Under Justice Kennedy’s objective approach, a court would be 
hard-pressed to classify the Cemetery as anything other than a public forum.  
In addition to the physical similarities, it is difficult to see how expressive 
activity in general would be incompatible with the normal uses of the 
Cemetery—especially if, as a factual matter, it had been opened to expressive 
activity by veterans’ groups. 
Id. at 1240. 
 131. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); 
see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678 (elaborating on the forum 
categories defined in Perry). 
 132. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, PYRAMID (2006), 
http://www.search.eb.com.proxy.wcl.american.edu:2048/eb/article-9062034 (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2007) (describing the use of pyramids throughout the world, but 
most notably in Egypt and Central and South America, as royal tombs, especially 
between 2686 and 2345 B.C.); ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, SPAIN (2006), 
http://www.search.eb.com.proxy.wcl.american.edu:2048/eb/article-70345 (last 
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Specifically, those cemeteries held by the National Cemetery 
Administration (“NCA”) and Arlington National Cemetery have 
conferred this right on visitors since the 1860s, when the federal 
government commissioned their development.133 
Admittedly, the Court has held that, although the government has 
opened its property to the public for such use, it is not required to do 
so indefinitely.134  Yet, so long as the property remains open to the 
public, it takes on the same qualities as a traditional public forum.135  
Here, the federal government continues to keep all cemeteries 
subject to the Act open to the public.  With an average of twenty-eight 
funerals per day,136 Arlington National Cemetery welcomes around 
four million visitors every year.137  Furthermore, the cemetery’s Visitor 
Center offers maps and guidebooks, displays exhibits, provides 
information services including grave locations, and contains a 
bookstore, all designed to entice people to visit and accommodate 
them upon arrival.138  While this is not typical of all federal 
cemeteries, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 123 National 
                                                          
visited Mar. 11, 2007) (discussing the prominence of tombs, funerary monuments 
and cemeteries in Spain between 4500 and 3200 B.C.).  See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA ONLINE, CEMETERY (2006), http://www.search.eb.com.proxy.wcl.america 
n.edu:2048/eb/article-9022046 (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (reviewing a general 
history of cemeteries world-wide and the impact of different religious, geographic, 
and cultural factors on their development). 
 133. See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, COMMC’NS AND OUTREACH SUPPORT DIV., The 
National Cemetery Administration, available at http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/pdf/nca. 
pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2007) (highlighting that, in 1862, Congress enacted 
legislation authorizing the president to establish national cemeteries for fallen 
soldiers, who created the first fourteen that year); Arlington National Cemetery 
Visitor Information, Arlington National Cemetery Facts, http://www.arlington 
cemetery.org/visitor_information/anc_facts.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) 
(explaining that in 1864, the Secretary of War designated Arlington Mansion and two 
hundred acres around it for the burial grounds of veterans). 
 134. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (noting that a state may close its facility to 
the public). 
 135. See id. (explaining that so long as a state retains an open facility, content-
based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral time, 
place, and manner regulations are permitted); see also Police Dep’t of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (noting that “[o]nce a forum is opened up to 
assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from 
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say”). 
 136. See Arlington National Cemetery Facts, supra note 133 (estimating that the 
cemetery conducts about 6400 funerals per year, with interments and inurnments 
averaging about twenty-eight per day). 
 137. See Arlington National Cemetery, Visitor Information, http://www.arlington 
cemetery.org/visitor_information/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (explaining 
that the four million visitors each year include tourists as well as those attending 
funerals or paying respect to gravesites). 
 138. Id. 
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Cemeteries nevertheless received over 8.8 million visitors and 
interred more than 93,000 people in one recent year.139 
Arlington National Cemetery and the cemeteries of the NCA can 
hardly be deemed nonpublic fora.  The Court has previously found 
locations such as jails, military bases, and school mail systems to be 
nonpublic fora because communication is not open to the public in 
these places, even though they are owned by the State.140  Specifically, 
in Adderley v. Florida,141 the Court distinguished a state capitol building 
from a county jail, finding that while the former’s grounds are open 
to the public, the latter’s grounds are not.142  Cemeteries, on the 
other hand, more closely resemble capitol grounds, where all citizens 
are permitted so long as they act peacefully.143 
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that, just as any 
property owner may maintain his or her property’s purpose, the 
government may likewise preserve the “lawfully dedicated” use of its 
property.144  For example, in Adderley, the Court reasoned that 
jailhouses close their grounds to serve the purpose of the facility’s 
existence—to provide security.145  A cemetery’s purpose is admittedly 
to bury the dead and provide a place for others to remember them.146  
However, the NCA and Arlington National cemeteries also serve as 
tourist attractions and welcoming centers for millions of visitors each 
year.147  Additionally, the Arlington National Cemetery 
                                                          
 139. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, COMMC’NS AND OUTREACH SUPPORT DIV., Facts 
About the National Cemetery Administration, available at http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/ 
pdf/facts.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (reporting that 8.8 million people visited the 
123 national cemeteries in fiscal year 2005). 
 140. See supra notes 30-32 (explaining the reasoning behind the Court’s holding 
that these different places are nonpublic fora). 
 141. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 142. See id. at 42-43 (distinguishing that case from Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229 (1963)). 
 143. See Adderley, 385 U.S. at 42-43. 
 144. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) 
(assessing a school mail system’s purpose); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) 
(assessing a military base’s purpose); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47 (assessing a county jail’s 
purpose). 
 145. See Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47 (explaining that state capitol grounds are 
traditionally open to the public so long as the visitors are peaceful, whereas jailhouse 
grounds have no such tradition). 
 146. Memorandum from Dr. Tony Walter, Lecturer and Reader, University of 
Reading, to the Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs, 
House of Commons, United Kingdom Parliament (Dec. 2000), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmenvtra/91/91m
48.htm. 
 147. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text (explaining that until the 
government closes a designated public forum, it is treated as a traditional public 
forum, and the number of visitors to the cemeteries here demonstrates that the 
government has not yet closed this forum). 
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Superintendent notably testified that demonstrations are part of the 
cemetery’s history, dating at least as far back as the Vietnam War.148 
The lower courts that categorized cemeteries as nonpublic fora 
failed to address the above issues, and instead brushed over the 
forum analysis, claiming that cemeteries are “clearly” and “obviously” 
nonpublic.149  Yet, as demonstrated above, a more in-depth discussion 
of forum jurisprudence reveals that municipal cemeteries fall largely 
within the definition of a designated public forum.  As such, content-
based restrictions on speech in cemeteries would be subject to strict 
scrutiny while content-neutral restrictions would be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.150 
Second, the areas outside of the cemetery property, including 
roads and sidewalks, should be deemed traditional public fora.  A 
traditional public forum is an area that has “immemorially been held 
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.”151  Public streets, sidewalks, 
and parks are the quintessence of traditional public fora.152  Within 
300 feet of the cemetery property and within 150 feet of any road or 
path leading to the cemetery property, there are countless public 
streets and sidewalks.  Depending on how one defines “road, 
pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from such cemetery 
property,” the area subject to the statute likely encompasses parks as 
well.153  Under established forum jurisprudence, then, the Court 
                                                          
 148. See generally The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act:  Hearing on H.R. 23, H.R. 
601, H.R. 2188, H.R. 2963, H.R. 5037, and H.R. 5038 Before the Subcomm. on Disability 
Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2006) [hereinafter Hearings], at 98 (statement of John Charles Metzler, Jr., 
Superintendent, Arlington National Cemetery). 
 149. Supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (noting that content-based restrictions in 
both traditional and/or designated public fora face strict scrutiny analysis, while 
content-neutral restrictions face intermediate scrutiny). 
 151. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 152. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (finding that public streets and 
sidewalks are traditional public fora because they have been immemorially used for 
citizens to assemble, communicate, and engage in public debate). 
 153. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2006); 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(B).  
With a number of public roads leading onto cemetery property, it is difficult to say 
where a court would draw the line.  For example, a major roadway has an exit 
providing direct ingress to and egress from Arlington National Cemetery property 
and that roadway continues for miles in either direction.  In applying the statute, one 
wonders where the 150-foot radius surrounding the road ends.  Does the bubble 
continue until the roadway’s end?  This ambiguity would probably be examined in a 
vagueness analysis under a procedural due process challenge.  See supra note 12 
(explaining the analysis in a facial challenge of a statute for vagueness).  However, 
this Comment touches on this issue in its discussion of whether the Act is narrowly 
tailored.  See infra notes 272, 274 and accompanying text (comparing this statute with 
CORNWELL.OFFTOPRINTER 6/2/2007  3:53:50 PM 
2007] A FINAL SALUTE TO LOST SOLDIERS 1351 
undoubtedly would deem the areas around the cemetery traditional 
public fora.  The statute as applied to both areas is therefore subject 
to the same level of scrutiny since both the cemetery property, a 
designated public forum, and the surrounding areas, traditional 
public fora, are within the “public” realm.154 
B. Assessing the Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act’s Content Neutrality 
After addressing the question of forum, the Court next asks 
whether the regulation is based on the content of the speaker’s 
message.155  Part II.B.1 maintains that the Act here should be deemed 
content based and subject to strict scrutiny because its enactment was 
biased, its language is viewpoint specific, and its enforcement is 
discriminatory.  Part II.B.2 argues that if nevertheless found to be a 
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on speech, the Act 
still could not survive intermediate scrutiny since it is not narrowly 
tailored. 
1. The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act is a content-based regulation of 
constitutionally protected speech and cannot survive strict scrutiny 
RAFHA is content based because its text distinguishes between 
speech based on viewpoint, it was enacted for biased reasons, and it is 
unfairly enforced.156  While the government may regulate certain 
categories of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment 
                                                          
those of other cases and arguing that, as in those cases, RAFHA restricts more speech 
than necessary and is therefore not narrowly tailored). 
 154. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (explaining that in both types of public 
fora, traditional and designated, intermediate scrutiny is applied to content-neutral 
restrictions and strict scrutiny is applied to content-based restrictions). 
 155. See id. at 770-76 (noting that the Court’s traditional approach to restrictions 
of First Amendment rights considers the forum first, then determines which standard 
of scrutiny to apply based on whether the law is content based or content neutral). 
 156. But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985-86 (E.D. Ky. 2006) 
(order granting preliminary injunction) (concluding that a Kentucky law quite 
similar to RAFHA was content neutral, although it was motivated by both content-
based and content-neutral factors).  In McQueary, the court found the law content 
neutral after it considered the legislature’s intent, government interests, and the 
law’s text, but did not consider the law’s enforcement.  See id. at 983-86 (finding the 
law content based to the extent that it was aimed at (a) prohibiting Westboro Baptist 
Church members specifically from protesting and (b) avoiding violent interaction 
between mourners and protesters, but ultimately concluding that the law was content 
neutral because of its other predominate purposes:  (a) to prevent all interference 
with funerals, regardless of its source or content, and (b) to protect citizens from 
unwanted communications).  While looking at the legislature’s motivation as well as 
the law’s text are important factors in determining content neutrality, consideration 
of the regulation’s enforcement is equally important.  See infra notes 159-160 and 
accompanying text (maintaining that where these three factors are biased, courts will 
find the speech restriction content based).  Since the district court ignored this 
factor, its finding that the Kentucky law was content neutral should have no impact 
on the analysis here. 
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based on content, RAFHA regulates protected speech.157  Therefore, 
because content-based regulations of protected speech are subject to 
strict scrutiny, the Court should test the Act under the strict scrutiny 
standard.  The Act, however, cannot meet this exacting standard 
because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest and could not even survive an analysis under 
the less-demanding intermediate scrutiny standard.158 
First, to determine whether the Act is content based, one must 
consider certain factors, including the restriction’s text, enactment, 
and enforcement.159  If the Court finds these factors to be biased, it 
likely will deem the regulation viewpoint-specific.160  Generally, where 
a law’s language expressly distinguishes between speech based on the 
views or ideas expressed, the Court finds that law to be content 
based.161  For example, in Hill, the Court found that a law restricting 
speech in front of medical clinics was not content based in part 
because its text made no reference to the content of the speech, but 
rather applied equally to all demonstrators.162 
RAFHA, on the other hand, does not apply equally to all 
demonstrators.  Instead, the text of the Act explicitly favors one 
category of speech over another, namely speech that is “part of a 
funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.”163  As such, RAFHA would 
not by its terms prohibit the Patriot Guard Riders from making noise, 
orating, or displaying banners or flags because their “demonstration” 
is considered part of the service.164  The Riders are a group of 
                                                          
 157. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (describing different types of 
unprotected speech). 
 158. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text (summarizing the strict and 
intermediate scrutiny standards and the difficulties in proving the higher standard’s 
requirements); infra Part II.B.2 (arguing that the Act does not meet the intermediate 
scrutiny standard because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant state 
interest and does not leave open ample alternative channels of communication). 
 159. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (analyzing an ordinance’s content neutrality by looking at its 
text, enactment, and enforcement). 
 160. Cf. id. (finding that the ordinance in that case was viewpoint neutral since its 
text, enactment, and enforcement did not favor one category of speech over 
another). 
 161. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (“As a general 
rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on 
the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.”). 
 162. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (determining that the law was 
content neutral because it was a regulation of place, not speech; it was not adopted 
because of disagreement with the speaker’s message and applied equally to all 
demonstrators; and the governmental interest was unrelated to the content of the 
speech). 
 163. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(b)(2)-(3) (West 2006). 
 164. See Patriot Guard Riders, Mission Statement, http://patriotguard.org/ 
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motorcyclists whose mission is to “[s]hield the mourning family and 
their friends from interruptions created by any protestor or group of 
protestors.”165  This group formed in response to the Westboro Baptist 
Church’s (“WBC”) actions and now demonstrates against WBC’s 
presence by escorting funeral guests to the funeral site or memorial 
service.166  The Riders’ presence at military funerals is as politically 
driven and demonstrative as that of their counterparts.167  The Riders 
arrive on loud motorcycles decorated with American flags, wear 
Patriot Guard Rider paraphernalia, and hold flags during the service 
to block picketers from the view of funeral guests.168 
Nevertheless, the motorcyclists would be permitted under the Act 
to demonstrate in their way, waving flags and wearing Patriot Guard 
Rider patches, since their expression is patriotic and thus considered 
“part of the funeral.”169  WBC picketers, on the other hand, would not 
be permitted to wave their signs or wear upside-down American flags 
in protest because this conduct would be deemed disrespectful and, 
therefore, not part of the funeral.  The Patriot Guard Riders are 
merely counter-protesting in response to WBC’s demonstrations and 
should be subject to this law if it is to be content neutral.170  Instead, 
the law’s text distinguishes between these two types of speech based 
on the ideas and views expressed, which is clearly content based 
under Hill.171 
                                                          
Home/tabid/53/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (noting that they attend 
funerals as guests of the deceased soldier’s family). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Evan Bayh, Bayh Joins Bipartisan Coalition 
Honoring Patriot Guard Riders (July 18, 2006), http://bayh.senate.gov/~bayh/relea 
ses/2006/0718JULY06PR.htm (explaining that the group started in Kansas in 
response to the Westboro Baptist Church protests and describing the Riders’ 
technique for countering the Church’s protests). 
 167. See Patriot Guard Riders, Our History, http://patriotguard.org/AboutUs/ 
OurHistory/tabid/145/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (stating that the 
group formed in August 2005 because it was “appalled to hear that a fallen hero’s 
memory was being tarnished by misguided religious zealots,” and that it immediately 
began “form[ing] a battle plan to combat Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist 
Church”). 
 168. See Patriot Guard Riders, PGR FAQ, http://patriotguard.org/PGRFAQ/tabid 
/250/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (stipulating that, while there is no 
official dress code, members are encouraged to purchase and wear Patriot Guard 
Riders patches); Press Release, U.S. Senator Evan Bayh, supra note 166 (describing a 
funeral where Riders stood with their backs to protesters and used American flags to 
block funeral-goers from seeing them). 
 169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (stating that, as guests of the 
family, the Riders are permitted to demonstrate under the statute). 
 170. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (explaining that laws that 
discriminate between viewpoints, whether discretely through application or explicitly 
in the statutory language, are most often content based). 
 171. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining the Hill Court’s 
reasoning for finding the law in controversy not to be content based). 
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Of course, the Court has held that even if a statute affects only 
certain speakers, it may nonetheless be deemed content neutral if it 
serves a purpose unrelated to the content of the expression.172  To 
make this determination, a content-neutrality analysis scrutinizes the 
statute’s enactment, asking whether the government passed the 
regulation because it disagreed with the message of the restricted 
expression.173  Here, hearing testimony and floor statements from 
members of Congress demonstrate that Congress enacted RAFHA 
because it strongly disagreed with the WBC’s message.174  In fact, one 
U.S. Representative went so far as to admit that “while we may 
disagree with the message, we don’t disagree that they have a right to 
deliver it.  It is just not appropriate.”175 
While the Act’s sponsors tried to use language that the Supreme 
Court already approved as constitutional,176 they nonetheless made 
clear that their objective was to silence those who protest the funerals 
of “military heroes.”177  The Act’s language prohibiting 
                                                          
 172. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that 
incidental effects on some messages or speakers but not others do not render a 
regulation content based so long as the governmental purpose is unrelated to the 
expression’s content) (citations omitted). 
 173. See id. (finding that a government regulation is content neutral where, by 
looking at the government’s purpose, it is justified without reference to the regulated 
speech’s content); Nauman, supra note 16, at 796 (explaining the Rock Against Racism 
test, in which the primary inquiry in determining the restriction’s content neutrality 
is whether the government’s principal motivation for adopting a law is based on a 
disagreement with the message conveyed).  But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 383-84 (1968) (stating the “familiar principle of constitutional law that [the 
Supreme] Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis 
of an alleged illicit legislative motive” because “[w]hat motivates one legislator to 
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to 
enact it”). 
 174. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 148, at 46-47 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution) (stating that he was promoting RAFHA 
before the Committee because of the recent trend of military funeral protests, which 
he finds incompatible with the respect owed to service members); 152 CONG. REC. 
H2204 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Silvestre Reyes) (stating that he 
disagreed with the message and that, although he believed they had a right to 
express it, doing so at military funerals was inappropriate); infra note 181 and 
accompanying text (quoting two congressmen’s understandings of RAFHA’s 
purpose). 
 175. 152 CONG. REC. H2204 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Silvestre 
Reyes). 
 176. See Hearings, supra note 148, at 44 (2006) (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers, 
Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (claiming that the Act uses, “word for 
word,” language already approved by the Court so as to “eliminate any doubt 
concerning the [c]onstitutionality of H.R. 5037”); 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. 
May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot) (explaining that the Act’s 
demonstration provision mirrors the language of the restriction upheld in Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). 
 177. See 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve 
Chabot) (describing the picketers’ tactics and saying that they “should not be 
consistent with our Nation’s laws”); 152 CONG. REC. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) 
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demonstrations, which includes making any “noise or diversion that 
disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the funeral,”178 
mirrors that of an anti-noise ordinance upheld in Grayned v. City of 
Rockford.179  The members of Congress supporting the Act argue that 
it is justified without reference to the regulated speech’s content 
because it was intended to keep the peace and respect the privacy of 
mourning family and friends.180  However, the sponsoring Congress 
members’ speeches regarding this statute make clear that its 
purpose—to prevent protesters who “feel a military funeral is an 
appropriate forum to display their beliefs on gay rights”—is one 
directly related to the content of the expression.181  Since the 
government enacted RAFHA because it disagreed with the message of 
the restricted expression, the Court should deem RAFHA content 
based. 
The Act’s enforcement is also biased.  As described above, it has 
not been and is not likely to be enforced against the Patriot Guard 
Riders.182  In fact, it is also quite unlikely that it will be enforced 
against tourists or other cemetery visitors who display American flags 
on their cars or clothing.  Nevertheless, those visitors are probably in 
violation of the law if they have an American flag pin attached to 
their lapel on cemetery property or within a 300-foot radius of the 
cemetery property line during the applicable times.  Such biased 
enforcement is yet another factor demonstrating that this law is not 
content neutral, but rather viewpoint specific. 
                                                          
(statement of Sen. Larry Craig) (explaining that the Act was “conceived in response 
to hateful, intolerant demonstrations taking place at the funeral services of deceased 
servicemembers”). 
 178. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2006). 
 179. Cf. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107-08 (upholding an ordinance that read:  “[N]o 
person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a 
school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of 
any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of 
such school session or class thereof . . . . ”). 
 180. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200-01 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Silvestre Reyes) (explaining that the protests disrupt the sanctity of the funerals and 
the privacy of the families in mourning).  These governmental interests, which have 
little merit, are examined below.  See infra notes 221-252 and accompanying text 
(assessing RAFHA’s governmental interests in the sanctity of cemeteries and the 
families’ privacy and dignity, and concluding that these interests fail to satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 181. 152 CONG. REC. E774 (Extensions of Remarks May 10, 2006) (statement of 
Rep. Dennis Moore); see also 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) 
(statement of Rep. Steve Buyer) (noting that after he recounted some of the WBC’s 
tactics, “most all [of] my colleagues shared a deep abhorrence to these outrageous 
acts and . . . share[d] equally a deep desire to prevent them”). 
 182. See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (discussing the Patriot Guard 
Riders’ tactics in counter-demonstrating against the WBC, including wearing Rider 
insignia). 
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When the Supreme Court finds that a statute is indeed content 
based, it then determines whether the Act regulates protected or 
unprotected expression under the First Amendment.183  Political 
speech, as restricted here, is among the quintessential forms of 
protected speech.184  With regard to printed or symbolic expression, 
the Supreme Court has held that peaceful picketing and leafletting 
constitute protected “speech” for purposes of a First Amendment 
analysis.185  Nevertheless, where the speech’s content is extremely 
provocative and plays “no essential part of any exposition of ideas,” it 
is possible that it no longer falls under the First Amendment’s 
protection.186 
Here, the Act’s supporters harp on the family’s vulnerable state, 
the dignity of fallen soldiers, and the WBC protesters’ offensive 
language in defending the restrictions.187  However, the Court has 
held that neither the “sensitive person standard” nor the “dignity 
standard” is the appropriate gauge for determining what speech must 
be censored.188  Instead, the Court relies on “community standards,” 
whereby the Court judges a message based on its impact on an 
average person, not a particularly susceptible or sensitive one.189  In 
                                                          
 183. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (describing different types and 
the alternative analysis of “expression” unprotected under the First Amendment). 
 184. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (recognizing that the Court has 
long held that the First Amendment protects debate on public issues (citing New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
145 (1983); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))). 
 185. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (“There is no doubt that as a 
general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving 
‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted). 
 186. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also id. at 574 
(defining fighting words as those “epithets likely to provoke the average person to 
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace”). 
 187. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve 
Buyer) (claiming that the Constitution should not be manipulated to justify the 
harassment of grieving families by protesters with offensive signs); 152 CONG. REC. 
H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) (stating that protesters 
are harassing mourning families with hurtful signs and speech, which causes undue 
stress for the families and lessens the pride and dignity in burying fallen soldiers). 
 188. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574-75 (2002) (“[T]his Court held that 
this sensitive person standard was ‘unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of 
speech and press’ and approved a standard requiring that material be judged from 
the perspective of ‘the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))); Boos, 485 
U.S. at 322 (rejecting the assertion that “protecting the dignity of foreign diplomatic 
personnel” by shielding them from insults qualifies as a compelling governmental 
interest because such a dignity standard is too subjective and would punish speech 
with an emotional impact on the audience, contrary to free speech jurisprudence); 
see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974) (emphasizing that the 
principal purpose of the community standards criterion “is to assure that the 
material is judged neither on the basis of each juror’s personal opinion, nor by its 
effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group”). 
 189. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted). 
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fact, even where the United States was bound by international treaty 
to prevent impairment to the dignity of foreign diplomats, the Court 
rejected the “dignity standard” and held that, under the First 
Amendment, people must tolerate both insulting and outrageous 
speech in public debate.190  Therefore, any argument that insulting 
expression should be curbed because funeral-goers are in an 
emotionally vulnerable state is legally invalid, despite being morally 
proper. 
Alternatively, the Act’s supporters might argue that the WBC’s 
speech is unprotected because it is offensive or constitutes fighting 
words.191  Yet, the protesters’ speech falls within neither of these 
definitions.  To begin, a restriction may curtail offensive speech only 
when the expression is so intrusive that an unwilling audience is 
captive and cannot avoid it.192  An audience is captive when it cannot 
help but listen to or see a certain message.193  Persons in their home 
exemplify a captive audience,194 but the Court has also recognized an 
unwilling listener’s “right” to avoid unwanted communication in 
confrontational public settings.195  Although the Supreme Court held 
in earlier cases that it is up to the listener to avoid unwanted speech 
outside of the home,196 it later moved away from this approach.197  For 
                                                          
 190. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (explaining that First Amendment speech rights 
need breathing space in order to survive and refusing to punish speech that 
adversely impacts listeners (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 
(1988))). 
 191. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (suggesting that supporters 
might rely on the offensive speech and fighting words doctrines to defend speech 
restrictions, but ultimately finding that they would not be applicable to recent 
funeral protests). 
 192. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (finding that the First 
Amendment permits prohibition of offensive speech where the audience is captive by 
deeming such speech “intrusive”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) 
(explaining that, in the context of the unwilling listener, the First Amendment does 
not require captive audiences to “undertake Herculean efforts” to avoid unwanted 
communication (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 
(1994))). 
 193. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 776-80 (defining a captive audience according 
to earlier cases, but suggesting that Hill may have expanded the doctrine’s scope). 
 194. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 (acknowledging that while “the right to avoid 
unwelcome speech” is particularly strong in and around one’s home, it can also be 
protected in public confrontational settings (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970), and Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485)). 
 195. See id. at 717 n.24 (explaining that “[t]his common-law ‘right’ is more 
accurately characterized as an ‘interest’ that States can choose to protect in certain 
situations” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967))). 
 196. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 777 (explaining that Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971), stood for this principle, which makes it quite difficult for an audience 
to be deemed “captive” in public places); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive 
Audience, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 96 (1991) (claiming that Supreme Court 
decisions like Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15, and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
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instance, in abortion clinic cases, the Court has analogized patients in 
clinics to residents in private homes, finding that certain speech was 
not permitted outside of the clinic because targeted picketing of a 
clinic, like that of a home, threatened the patients’ well-being.198  
Patients approaching the clinic but not yet inside, however, were not 
considered captive and, as a general matter, had to tolerate picketers’ 
peaceful speech on the sidewalks.199 
Here, picketing a cemetery is like picketing a clinic in that the 
targeted audience is probably in a vulnerable emotional state and 
must use the sidewalks to reach their final destination.  There are, 
nevertheless, several important differences between the two.  First, 
medical circumstances held clinic patients captive since they could 
not leave the facility or their health might be endangered.200  
Cemetery visitors, on the other hand, are not bound to the cemetery 
property by any condition, such as treatment at a clinic, but choose to 
attend the services at a public location.201  That brings up a second 
point:  the memorial services are indeed held in a public location.  
Granted, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,202 a plurality decision, the 
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting political 
advertisements in city buses, which are undoubtedly public, because 
the captive audience would be forced to withstand political 
                                                          
205 (1975), emphasize that the responsibility of avoiding offensive speech falls on 
the listener). 
 197. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) 
(holding that city transit system patrons were captive even though they could turn 
away from offensive speech). 
 198. See William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener:  Hill v. Colorado’s Chilling Effect on 
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 406 (2001) (citing Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)) (explaining that the Madsen Court found the 
state’s interests in protecting a captive audience, ensuring public safety, and 
preventing traffic problems sufficient to justify the injunction). 
 199. See Lee supra note 198, at 406-08 (discussing Madsen, which upheld a 
restriction on noise levels but struck down the restriction on “images observable” 
based on the difference in effort that patients must make to avoid unwanted 
communication). 
 200. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357, 372 (1997) 
(listing the reasons, including protecting the medical privacy of “captive” patients, 
for finding constitutional the injunction in Madsen, which prohibited displaying 
images or making noise that could be seen or heard in the clinic as well as 
approaching any person within a 300-foot radius of the clinic unless the person 
acquiesced). 
 201. But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order 
granting preliminary injunction) (assuming that funeral attendees, like clinic 
patients, are captive because they have no choice in the funeral service’s location and 
must go to the designated place if they wish to take part in the event). 
 202. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
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propaganda.203  The bus riders were deemed captive because they 
were taking public transit “as a matter of necessity, not of choice.”204  
Here, the families could choose to hold memorial services in their 
homes or in private funeral homes, and to bury their loved ones in 
private cemeteries.205 
Moreover, a majority of the Court held in Lehman that the degree 
of captivity largely depends on location, with a bus passenger 
suffering a significantly higher degree of captivity than a person on 
the street.206  Mourners attending services in cemeteries pass 
demonstrators on the street, and are thus captive to a lesser degree, if 
at all.207  For these reasons, the funeral-goers are hardly a captive 
audience and, because speech is offensive only when it intrudes upon 
an unwilling, captive audience,208 the speech here cannot be found 
offensive.  
Additionally, the fighting words doctrine is not applicable to the 
expression here because the protests lack the close proximity of 
physical contact, the direct provocation of violence, and an imminent 
and significant breach of the peace.209  The doctrine removes from 
the First Amendment’s protection those words “likely to provoke the 
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the 
peace.”210  Here, while the WBC’s speech may offend the great 
                                                          
 203. See id. at 303 (finding that the city has discretion in making reasonable 
decisions on who may advertise in what the Court termed “part of the [transit 
system’s] commercial venture”). 
 204. Id. at 302 (citation omitted). 
 205. See infra notes 251-252 and accompanying text (discussing these options with 
regard to preserving the family’s privacy interests). 
 206. See Christopher Dengler, Cell Phones and the First Amendment in Flight:  
Can the FCC and FAA Maintain the Ban? 35-36 (Mar. 8, 2006) (unpublished J.D. 
student symposium article, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review), available at 
http://llr.lls.edu/symposium/Dengler%20-%20final.doc (explaining that both the 
plurality and concurring opinions agreed that the degree of captivity and intrusion 
of privacy varied according to location of the audience). 
 207. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order 
granting preliminary injunction) (holding that funeral attendees, despite finding 
them to be captive, could easily avoid observing unwanted written expression by 
averting their eyes upon passing protesters). 
   208.  See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text. 
   209. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (finding that even if all three 
of these elements were present, the Act would be pointless since laws forbidding a 
breach of the peace are already in place and would handle such situations).  It is 
relevant to note that the fighting words doctrine has hardly, if ever, been used to 
uphold a conviction since its introduction in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942).  See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (identifying the fighting 
words doctrine as “rarely used”); FreedomForum.org, What is the Fighting Words 
Doctrine?, http://www.freedomforum.org/packages/first/fightingwords/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (summarizing the doctrine’s usage and concluding that the 
Court has not used it to uphold a conviction since its creation). 
 210. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574. 
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majority of passersby, perhaps even causing others to become 
aggressive, this alone cannot be deemed an incitement to breach the 
peace.  That is, even if the protesters need police protection due to 
the crowd’s disagreement with their views, “constitutional rights may 
not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or 
exercise.”211 
As explained in Part I, the speech must also be directed at an 
individual or small group of people and play no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas.212  While one may argue that the WBC’s 
distasteful slogans target individuals attending the funerals,213 one can 
hardly deem the expression to play no essential part of debate.  
Political dissent is one of the most valued types of expression in 
America and has been since before this country’s inception.214  WBC’s 
demonstrations are designed to express disagreement with United 
States policies and constitute the quintessence of political speech.215  
As such, the speech does not fall under the fighting words doctrine. 
Finally, assuming that the Court finds the Act to be a content-based 
regulation of protected speech, the Court would apply its strict 
scrutiny standard.216  Often, the Court’s application of strict scrutiny 
to regulations is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”217  Here, the Act 
cannot meet this standard’s high requirements, as it cannot even 
satisfy the lower intermediate scrutiny standard.218 
                                                          
 211. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (quoting Watson v. City of 
Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)). 
 212. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Anti-gay group protests at National Cemetery, supra note 1 (stating that the 
picketers held a sign proclaiming “You’re going to Hell”).  
 214. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957) (discussing the 
importance of the freedom of speech, particularly the freedom of minority political 
expression, in the foundation of America’s democracy). 
 215. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (stating that WBC members 
protest because they disagree with the nation’s tolerance of homosexuality). 
 216. For a content-based statute to survive strict scrutiny, it must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored, and use the least restrictive 
means for achieving the state interest.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text 
(articulating the requirements for a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis). 
 217. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that the strict scrutiny standard is often fatal); Eugene Volokh, Parent-
Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 665 (2006) 
(finding that the strict scrutiny standard in the context of free speech is “‘strict’ in 
theory and fatal in fact”) (citation omitted).  But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” (citing 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995))). 
 218. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (describing the high 
requirements of strict scrutiny review and the difficulties in meeting the exacting 
standard). 
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2. The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, if found to be a content-
neutral time, place, and manner restriction, cannot survive intermediate 
scrutiny 
As explained above, a statute survives intermediate scrutiny where 
it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and 
leaves open ample channels for communication of the message.219  
Here, the Act would not survive because the government interest is 
not significant, the law is not narrowly tailored,220 and the restrictions 
do not leave open ample channels of expression. 
The government intends RAFHA to serve two stated interests.  
First, it is designed to protect the character and sanctity of the 
military cemeteries, as demonstrated by its provision forbidding 
                                                          
 219. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
 220. While an argument may be made that RAFHA is overbroad, the Court likely 
would reject this argument by relying on Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).  Laws 
that are overbroad not only fail the narrowly tailored test, but are facially 
unconstitutional because they deter constitutionally protected activity.  See Virginia v. 
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (explaining that the Court developed the First 
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth out of concern that an overbroad law, 
especially one imposing criminal punishment, would discourage citizens from 
engaging in constitutionally protected speech because they feared litigation and/or 
punishment); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 463 n.11 (1987) 
(concluding that, although obstruction of police duties “might constitutionally be 
punished under a properly tailored statute,” the statute criminalized constitutionally 
protected speech and was thus overbroad and invalid); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972) (finding that an overbroad law deters constitutionally 
protected activity and therefore poses a significant threat to First Amendment 
rights).  The Court has reasoned that, since the “social costs” of enforcing an 
overbroad law are significant, the doctrine appropriately mandates total invalidation 
of the speech regulation.  Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119 (reasoning that overbreadth 
adjudication decreases “social costs” such as reduced expression and a repressed 
marketplace of ideas resulting from the withholding of protected speech).  For a law 
to be deemed overbroad, it must have the effect of substantially restricting 
constitutionally protected conduct.  See id. at 119-20 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)) (finding that an overbroad law’s application to protected 
activity must be substantial, both absolutely and relative to the scope of the law’s 
legitimate applications, so as to prevent permitting constitutionally unprotected 
conduct, which could result from overapplication of the overbreadth doctrine).  In 
Hill v. Colorado, the Court distinguished between laws that by their terms restrict 
protected speech and those that restrict unprotected conduct, yet also encompass 
protected speech.  530 U.S. at 730-31 (explaining that the defendants misplaced 
their reliance on cases concerning regulations of unprotected activity that also 
implicated protected speech because here defendants challenged a regulation of 
protected speech).  While the overbreadth doctrine applies to the latter, the former 
is simply a matter of plain free speech analysis.  See id. (finding that the defendants 
misunderstood the overbreadth doctrine in attempting to apply it to a statute that 
bans protected speech by its terms, instead finding that, as a content-neutral speech 
regulation, the proper analysis was whether it was a reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulation of protected conduct).  Here, the Act does not regulate 
unprotected speech as shown in Part II.B.1.  Therefore, the Court likely would find 
an overbreadth analysis of this law inappropriate. 
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disturbances of the peace or service.221  Second, the supporting 
members of Congress sought to protect the privacy of mourning 
family and friends of deceased service members.222  While the first 
interest might constitute a significant governmental interest, the 
second does not. 
The Court has not expressly recognized an interest in preserving 
the solemn character of military cemeteries, yet it likely would deem 
such an interest to be a significant governmental interest.  In Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, the Court found that preventing disturbances to 
school activities constitutes a valid state interest because noisy 
demonstrations are incompatible with normal school activities.223  
Likewise, the Court held in Ward v. Rock Against Racism that the State 
had a significant interest in protecting citizens from unwanted 
noise.224  Here, the government could argue that noisy 
demonstrations are incompatible with normal cemetery activities and 
that its interest in preserving the reverential character of military 
cemeteries is therefore valid. 
Alternatively, the government might argue that the Act is, in 
protecting the nature of the cemeteries, intended to protect against 
breaches of the peace.  Although the Court has consistently 
recognized an interest in preventing a breach of the peace, this is a 
weak argument here.225  In Cox v. Louisiana226 and Edwards v. South 
Carolina,227 the Court invalidated statutes designed to protect against 
breaches of the peace because they were overly broad and punished 
                                                          
 221. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve 
Buyer) (stating that the Act will protect the sanctity of military funerals); 152 CONG. 
REC. H2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of David F. Forte, Professor of Law, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance 
and Mem’l Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs) (explaining that the text of 
the Act, which prohibits diversions causing disturbance of the peace or funeral, 
makes clear that its purpose is to guarantee the dignity of military funerals). 
 222. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve 
Buyer) (stating that the Act will protect grieving families’ privacy); Hearings, supra 
note 148, at 44 (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce) (stating that he introduced the legislation to “shelter grieving families 
from demonstrators trying to disrupt funeral services”); id. at 52 (statement of Rep. 
Silvestre Reyes) (arguing that the “bill is narrowly tailored to protect military families 
from . . . verbal attacks”). 
 223. See 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance because it 
was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest). 
 224. See 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (finding that this interest may be greatest when 
protecting unwanted noise penetrating the home, but in certain cases, it is also 
applicable in such traditional public fora as parks and streets). 
 225. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1989) (recognizing a 
government interest in preventing a breach of the peace, but finding that on the 
facts in that flag-burning case, the interest could not support the conviction). 
 226. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
 227. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
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peaceful, albeit loud and disfavored, expression.228  The Court has 
repeatedly held that “[t]he mere fact that expressive activity causes 
hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression 
unprotected.”229  Here, the Court likely would find that the funeral 
picketers are not causing a breach of the peace since, although they 
sing and chant loudly, they are not using “fighting words,” but merely 
presenting ideas contrary to that of the majority.230 
Conversely, the Court probably would reject the suggested interest 
in protecting the family’s privacy.  The Court has found two relevant 
privacy interests adequately significant to pass intermediate 
scrutiny.231  First, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court recognized the privacy 
interest in avoiding unwanted communication, a part of a citizen’s 
larger common law “right to be let alone,” on public sidewalks.232  In 
the context of that case, this interest protected those entering a 
medical facility from “persistent importunity, following and 
dogging.”233  Hesitant to define this interest too broadly, the Court 
conceded that the interest’s strength varies with location234 and it 
must be balanced with the right of others to communicate.235  In Hill, 
                                                          
 228. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 550-51 (reversing the convictions of protesters who had 
picketed, sang, orated, clapped, and stomped their feet in the state capitol building 
in part because their action was not inciting violence in any way); Edwards, 372 U.S. 
at 237-38 (finding the offense to be too generalized, and thus the conviction invalid, 
because all that was needed to prove a violation was that protesters presented views 
sufficiently disfavored by the public to necessitate police protection). 
 229. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 230. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (analogizing to Edwards, 372 U.S. 229, and 
distinguishing from Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), where a public speaker 
encouraged black listeners to rise up against whites and caused the crowd to become 
restless, because the protesters’ actions in Cox were significantly different).  
 231. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) 
(finding that families of deceased persons can assert a valid privacy interest in police 
images of the deceased against the media); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 
(2000) (describing the unwilling listener’s interest in being “let alone” as one of the 
most valued rights). 
 232. 530 U.S. at 716; see Nauman, supra note 16, at 770 (explaining that although 
the Court found such an interest existed, it did not clarify when or where it would 
apply in future cases).  This interest appears to be the primary justification for the 
captive audience doctrine, discussed above in Part II.B.1.  See Strauss, supra note 196, 
at 106-16 (explaining that courts typically use this right or the “right to privacy” to 
justify the captive audience doctrine and suggesting that these ambiguous rights 
could mean one of three things:  the right to choose, the right to repose, or the right 
to be free from offensive speech). 
 233. Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Am. Steel 
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921)). 
 234. See id. at 716 (explaining that such a privacy interest is less important when in 
a public park than in one’s private residence) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15, 21-22 (1971)). 
 235. See id. at 718 (explaining that even though preserving the freedom to 
communicate is a substantial concern, it must nonetheless be weighed against the 
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demonstrators sought to educate those entering the clinic and 
purposefully followed patients in order to have a discussion with 
them.236 
The privacy interest in Hill is nevertheless distinguishable from the 
privacy interest advanced in support of RAFHA.  Here, the interest is 
not as significant as it was in Hill because the protesters are not 
“following and dogging,” but picketing in one place on public streets 
and sidewalks.237  Under Hill, people may approach others, even in an 
offensive manner, with the purpose of educating them or trying to 
convince them of another viewpoint until the person declines the 
offer.238  At that point, the advocate must cease and desist.239  WBC’s 
purpose is to persuade American citizens and politicians to change 
their lifestyles and this country’s public policies.240  Yet, even if done 
aggressively or offensively, there is no privacy interest as described in 
Hill since the picketers are not approaching those attending funerals, 
but rather demonstrating in one place at cemetery entrances.241  The 
physical proximity in such instances is thus nothing like that in Hill, 
where “sidewalk counselors” approached individuals entering the 
medical facility to speak with them one-on-one.242  Without such 
physical proximity, the privacy interest as protected in Hill is simply 
not relevant here.  Lastly, the final consideration from Hill weighs the 
                                                          
right to be let alone) (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 
(1970)). 
 236. See Lee, supra note 198, at 389-94 (describing tactics used by “sidewalk 
counselors,” such as closely approaching patients and trying to establish a rapport 
with them, displaying graphic printed materials if patients “[do] not respond to 
‘positive’ literature,” and praying for them). 
 237. See Anti-gay group protests at National Cemetery, supra note 1 (describing the 
WBC protesters’ location in a small, closed-off area across a four-lane highway from 
the protesters supporting the military families).  
 238. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18 (finding that accosting a person in an offensive 
way to debate an issue does not violate that person’s rights, but once he or she 
refuses the discussion, “following and dogging” becomes annoying and borders on 
intimidation (quoting Am. Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 204)). 
 239. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18 (applying the free passage into work rule (from 
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 
(1921)) to medical facilities). 
 240. See Westboro Baptist Church, FAQ, http://www.godhatesamerica.com/ghfmi 
r/main/faq.html#Who (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (explaining that the WBC perceives 
homosexual tolerance as a threat to America and that they protest in order to 
change America’s policies). 
 241. See Margie J. Phelps, Lifting up an Ensign to the Nation:  Showing the Signs to 
Bombastic Big Mouth Bastard President Bush, WBC EPICS, May 29, 2006, http://www.god 
hatesfags.com/featured/epics/2006/20060529_arlington-va-epic.pdf (recounting 
the WBC protest at Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day 2006). 
 242. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 708 (describing sidewalk counselors’ tactics, including 
conversation and distribution of literature). 
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right to communicate with the privacy interest.243  Here, free speech 
wins out since, as described above, the picketers are not targeting 
individuals, but are staying in one spot.  Because WBC does not 
follow or approach particular passersby, it would be quite easy for 
visitors to ignore the communication and continue walking.  
Therefore, any privacy interest hardly suffers when the right to 
communicate is granted. 
The second relevant privacy interest comes from National Archives 
& Records Administration v. Favish.244  There, the Supreme Court found 
that families of deceased persons have a privacy interest against 
public intrusions.245  While such a general interest might appear to 
support a privacy interest in RAFHA, a closer look reveals the Court’s 
intended meaning of this right.  In fact, the right is defined quite 
narrowly, protecting only a family’s right to make burial 
arrangements for the body and “to limit attempts to exploit pictures 
of the deceased family member’s remains for public purposes.”246 
With regard to RAFHA’s scope, this interest is irrelevant.  The 
Favish Court based its privacy claim on families who wished not to 
have crime scene photographs of the deceased’s corpse disclosed to 
the public.247  That interest thus hinges on private information being 
publicly revealed.248  The privacy claim at issue here protects no 
private information about the deceased or the family.  Instead, the 
claimed interest seeks to protect the family’s privacy by sheltering it 
from content being publicly expressed at a funeral on public 
property.249  This is essentially the “dignity standard” as rejected in 
Boos.  There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that people must tolerate 
insulting and outrageous speech and that an interest in shielding 
                                                          
 243. See id. at 718 (“While the freedom to communicate is substantial, ‘the right of 
every person “to be let alone” must be placed in the scales with the right of others to 
communicate.’” (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 
(1970))). 
 244. 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
 245. See id. at 167 (finding that such a right is supported by common law and 
cultural tradition). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 160 (defining the issues as (1) whether a privacy interest in criminal 
records and documents extends to the family where the family objects to disclosure 
of crime scene photographs and, if so, (2) whether the family interest in privacy 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure). 
 248. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (finding that familial privacy is 
irrelevant in funeral protests because no private information is being disclosed). 
 249. See id. (explaining that familial privacy does not protect against the public 
expression of views). 
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certain persons from speech with an adverse emotional impact is 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.250 
Furthermore, families can hardly expect privacy while mourning in 
a public cemetery, especially those cemeteries that welcome up to 
four million visitors per year.251  If privacy is of such importance to the 
families, they should limit their mourning to private churches, 
cemeteries, and homes.252  Given this background, the privacy interest 
as submitted here simply is not a significant state interest. 
Second, RAFHA is not narrowly tailored.  The Court has defined a 
narrowly tailored regulation as one that promotes a substantial 
government interest that could not be achieved as effectively if the 
regulation were not in place.253  Here, the government could equally 
achieve its interests by enforcing other rules already in place.  Under 
Section 1.218 of Title 38, the Code of Federal Regulations already 
criminalizes most of the conduct addressed by RAFHA, such as 
disturbances, demonstrations, and distribution of handbills on 
property under the charge and control of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, which includes the NCA.254  Likewise, Arlington 
National Cemetery is protected under the Code, which sets out the 
visitor rules and prohibits certain disruptive conduct on cemetery 
grounds.255  With such regulations in place, the government’s interest 
in protecting the sanctity of the cemeteries is already served.  In fact, 
the Superintendent of Arlington National Cemetery has said that the 
combination of these two restrictions has “adequately addressed 
potential demonstrations and disruptive behavior in the past.”256  The 
                                                          
 250. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (holding that a law prohibiting 
protests near foreign embassies and consulates was unconstitutional, despite an 
international agreement not to offend diplomats).  But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 
F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction) 
(relying on the state interest in protecting citizens’ right to participate in events 
without interference from others to find that there exists a significant state interest in 
preventing interference with funerals) (citation omitted). 
 251. See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text (reporting the estimated 
number of visitors and interments per year at the Arlington National Cemetery and 
NCA cemeteries). 
 252. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (asserting that families 
seeking to avoid hateful speech so as to mourn in peace have the option of mourning 
in private churches, temples, funeral homes, cemeteries, and residences). 
 253. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (explaining that, 
while a regulation satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement where a substantial 
government interest would be achieved effectively without it, this standard does not 
mean that such a regulation may burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
achieve the government’s interest) (citation omitted). 
 254. 38 C.F.R. § 1.218 (2006). 
 255. 32 C.F.R. § 553.22 (2006). 
 256. Hearings, supra note 148, at 98 (statement of John Charles Metzler, Jr., 
Superintendent, Arlington National Cemetery). 
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cemetery superintendent is probably the most qualified person to 
determine if the rules already in place were sufficient to prevent 
disturbance to visitors.257  If the superintendent finds these less 
restrictive means of regulating speech to be sufficient, then the Court 
should likewise hold them to be adequate and find RAFHA 
unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored. 
When seeking support for the Act in Congress, members of 
Congress largely relied on Grayned v. City of Rockford to demonstrate 
that the Act was constitutional.258  In Grayned, the Court found a city’s 
anti-noise ordinance, prohibiting willful making of noise or 
diversions near a school that tend to disturb class sessions, 
constitutional.259  The Court noted three reasons for finding that 
provision to be narrowly tailored, which do not hold true for 
RAFHA.260 
First, the Grayned Court found the provision to be narrowly tailored 
because it allowed for peaceful picketing adjacent to school grounds, 
so long as the demonstration was not noisy.261  Here, however, the Act 
prohibits all picketing, noisy or not, within 150 feet of any road or 
path leading to the cemetery.262 
Second, the Court held that the ordinance gave no opportunity for 
punishing based on the content of one’s expression.263  Yet, as 
                                                          
 257. See 152 CONG. REC. H2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of David F. 
Forte, Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, before the Subcomm. on 
Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs, H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs) (finding that 
a national cemetery superintendent maintains the cemetery and its activities so as to 
honor fallen service members); see also Kate Pickert, A Field of Trees and Bones, LOST 
MAG., Dec. 2005, http://www.lostmag.com/issue1/treesbones.php (explaining that 
the current superintendent grew up on Arlington National Cemetery property and 
observed many of the changes and difficulties since the age of four, as his father had 
also previously served as Arlington Cemetery superintendent). 
 258. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Steve Chabot) (stating that RAFHA used almost the same language found to be 
constitutional in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). 
 259. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119 (finding that the law was not overbroad, but 
narrowly tailored). 
 260. See id. at 119-21 (holding that the ordinance was narrowly tailored because it 
punished only conduct that disturbed school sessions, gave no license to punish 
picketers for the content of their message, and imposed only a modest and 
reasonable regulation consistent with both the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 261. See id. at 119-20 (finding that this limitation was narrowly tailored, even 
though the ordinance may prohibit some picketing that is neither violent nor 
physically obstructive). 
 262. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2006); cf. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 
F. Supp. 2d 975, 996 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction) 
(finding that a Kentucky law essentially identical to RAFHA was not narrowly 
tailored, in part, because it prohibited picketing or making any noise within 300 feet 
of a funeral whether or not funeral attendees could see or hear demonstrators). 
 263. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 120 (noting that the ordinance prevented 
interference with the school’s function without preventing peaceful picketing or 
giving license to punish picketers because of their message).  
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explained above in Part II.B.1 and below in Part II.C, RAFHA does 
punish based on content.  Its enforcement is biased264 and it gives 
license to cemetery officials to determine whether individuals may 
demonstrate on cemetery grounds, but provides no standards for who 
may be excused from the Act’s restrictions.265 
Third, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance imposed only 
a modest and reasonable regulation.266  One example the Court cited 
in Grayned was that the provision was only effective during school 
hours and protesters could therefore demonstrate before and after 
hours as students and staff entered or left school grounds.267  RAFHA, 
on the other hand, is effective for one hour before and after each 
funeral.268  Since most guests probably arrive and leave within this 
time frame, it is quite likely that the majority of guests will not cross 
paths with the demonstrators.  In fact, this time restriction is 
essentially a total restriction.  While the NCA cemeteries conduct an 
average of two services per day,269 Arlington conducts an average of 
twenty-eight.270  Arlington only operates for either nine or eleven 
hours each day.271  Therefore, there are likely two or three services 
each hour of operation.  At least with regard to Arlington, then, the 
Act prohibits demonstrations at any time when it might be effective in 
reaching the intended audience. 
Additionally, with a buffer zone of 300 feet surrounding cemetery 
property and 150 feet from any road or path leading to the cemetery, 
                                                          
 264. See supra notes 162-171, 182 and accompanying text (explaining how the Act 
does not apply equally to all demonstrators, but rather disfavors the WBC protestors 
in favor of patriotic speech). 
 265. See infra notes 288-297 and accompanying text (concluding that the Act 
permits official discretion that does not meet the acceptable standards for prior 
restraint, and that it is therefore facially unconstitutional). 
 266. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 121 (analogizing the ordinance to similar ordinances 
in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) and Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 
(1968), where the Court held that the special nature of a place may warrant 
reasonable regulations of protected speech). 
 267. Id. at 107.  Although another provision restricted picketing 150 feet from any 
school building for thirty minutes before and after school hours, the Court found 
that provision unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was 
content based and could not survive strict scrutiny.  Id. 
 268. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2) (West 2006). 
 269. See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Facts About the National Cemetery Administration, 
supra note 139 (estimating that the 123 NCA cemeteries bury more than 93,000 
people per year). 
 270. See Arlington National Cemetery Visitor Information, Arlington National 
Cemetery Facts, supra note 133 (estimating that Arlington conducts about 6,400 
funerals per year). 
 271. Arlington National Cemetery, Visitor Information, Hours, Access and 
Parking, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.org/visitor_information/hours-parking.html 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (stating that the Cemetery is open to the public every day 
of the year from 8 a.m. until 7 p.m. in the summer months, and until 5 p.m. the rest 
of the year). 
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RAFHA is hardly modest or reasonable.  In Grayned, the buffer zone 
for picketing was 150 feet from any building, not just the property.272  
In McQueary v. Stumbo,273 the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky considered a state law almost identical to RAFHA and 
recently issued a preliminary injunction, in part because the 300-foot 
buffer zone around cemetery property would restrict too much 
speech.274  Much like the law in that case, RAFHA’s scope is too broad 
and likely burdens more speech than necessary to serve the state 
interests.  As such, RAFHA cannot be deemed modest or reasonable, 
and certainly not narrowly tailored. 
Finally, the Court asks whether there exist ample alternative 
channels of communication for the speaker to share his or her 
message.  In Frisby v. Schultz,275 the Supreme Court upheld an 
ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of someone’s home because 
it left ample alternative channels for communication, including going 
door-to-door, marching through the neighborhoods, and contacting 
residents by phone or mail.276  Here, however, these alternatives are 
inadequate because it is more difficult to identify the targeted 
audience’s contact information.277 
Unlike in Frisby, where protesters targeted specific doctors whose 
home addresses were easily obtained, cemetery protesters are 
targeting unidentified tourists from all over the country in addition 
to specific funeral-goers.278  WBC believes that those visiting the 
cemetery or attending the service support America’s policies because 
they honor those who have died for the country.279  Additionally, 
going door-to-door and contacting by phone or mail are ineffective 
alternative channels when substituted for face-to-face 
                                                          
 272. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107 (quoting the anti-picketing ordinance the Court 
invalidated because it only permitted picketing by those involved in labor disputes). 
 273. 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
 274. See id. at 996 (explaining that a zone that large would restrict private property 
owners’ speech, as well as the general public’s communications on issues totally 
unrelated to the funeral). 
 275. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
 276. See id. at 483-84 (agreeing with appellants that such alternatives were 
sufficient). 
 277. Cf. Strauss, supra note 196, at 93 (discussing the decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and arguing that listening to a comedian on the radio 
is more affordable and easier than, and therefore not comparable to, paying for an 
album or a ticket to a live show). 
 278. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476 (recounting the protesters’ sidewalk demonstrations 
outside an abortion-performing doctor’s home on several occasions); Westboro 
Baptist Church, About WBC, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/aboutwbc.html 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (explaining that the Church seeks to teach biblical 
doctrines to “all men” through peaceful picketing). 
 279. See Rostow, supra note 4 (elaborating on WBC’s policies and beliefs). 
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communication.280  Protesters who send mass mailings or conduct 
door-to-door distributions hardly receive the attention that results 
from face-to-face interaction since mailings are easily thrown out, but 
demonstrations are harder to ignore.  Since the WBC has begun its 
campaign of demonstrations, it has received ample attention from 
the media as well as cemetery visitors.281  The WBC could not have 
achieved such notoriety without interacting with the targeted 
audience in this way. 
Another suggested alternative channel, the Internet, is likewise an 
insufficient alternative for three reasons.  First, it isolates public 
officials from protesters’ concerns, thus reducing opportunities for 
public debate.282  Second, cyberspace cannot replace the powerful 
symbolism of actually being at a street protest with others.283  Speech 
on the Internet shares few, if any, of the critical characteristics of 
public protests, which have a history of civil protest and are 
“cathartic, expressive, evocative, emotive, and meaningful to those 
who participate.”284  Finally, “the public square lives.”285  That is, while 
the public cannot commandeer the public square, it does depend 
upon streets, parks, and squares for visibility by the intended 
audience, including the media and politicians.286  As the Court has 
admitted, confrontational and disruptive protests are critical to 
promoting change.287 
                                                          
 280. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 780 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(finding that door-to-door distributions, mass mailings, and telephone campaigns are 
ineffective alternatives to interacting with women face-to-face outside of clinics); cf. 
Zick, supra note 84, at 648 (arguing that the Internet is an inadequate alternative 
because protesting in public is a uniquely effective and meaningful way of dispersing 
messages). 
 281. See, e.g., Westboro Baptist Church, Current WBC News, http://www.godhates 
fags.com/news/wbcnewsarchive.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (linking to hundreds 
of articles about the WBC funeral protests). 
 282. See Zick, supra note 84, at 647-48 (explaining that because public space is 
continually shrinking and being segmented into “non-places” such as malls and 
subways where First Amendment rights do not apply, it is more important than ever 
that public debate not be forced to the Internet). 
 283. See id. at 648 (theorizing that being physically present with masses of others is 
a critical aspect of public dissent since protests in public streets and squares continue 
to occur, despite the accessibility and simplicity of the Internet). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 649. 
 286. See id. at 649-50 (referencing recent protests against the war in Iraq, national 
political conventions, and presidential inauguration). 
 287. See id. (hypothesizing that the 1960s Civil Rights movement and Vietnam 
protests would have been hardly as effective had they been conducted in places 
effectively invisible to the public eye). 
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C. Even if Able to Survive Both Strict and Intermediate Scrutiny, the Act is 
Nonetheless Unconstitutional Because it Provides for Unbridled Discretion     
by Government Officials 
First Amendment jurisprudence prohibits standardless prior 
restraint because it renders protected speech vulnerable to biased 
censorship.288  The presumption of a prior restraint clause’s 
unconstitutionality289 is fully supported where certain safeguards are 
lacking.290  For content-based regulations, a prior restraint provision 
must provide three stringent safeguards, while provisions in content-
neutral regulations are required to meet two, weaker conditions.291  
RAFHA cannot stand as it provides for prior restraint and contains 
neither set of safeguards. 
If the Court initially found that RAFHA constituted a content-based 
restriction, its prior restraint provision would have to:  (1) permit 
restraint for only a specified, brief period; (2) provide for prompt 
final, judicial determination; and (3) impose on the censor the 
burden of initiating litigation and proving that the expression is 
                                                          
 288. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) 
(explaining that “a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a 
government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in 
censorship”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (finding that an 
ordinance requiring a permit from the city manager was facially unconstitutional 
because it subjected the freedom of the press to license and censorship). 
 289. One circuit court opined that the presumption is weaker in nonpublic fora 
than in public fora.  See Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1322-24 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that no Supreme Court case applies the prior restraint 
doctrine to nonpublic fora and that prior restraint is merely a form of speech 
regulation, which would be permissible in a nonpublic forum since the government 
is already permitted to restrict speech there).  For purposes of this Comment, it is 
assumed that the cemetery is a public forum and is therefore accorded the full 
weight of the presumption.  See supra Part I.A.  In Griffin, the Federal Circuit 
conceded that other circuits had invalidated regulations permitting standardless 
discretion in nonpublic fora.  See Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1323 (citing Sentinel Commc’ns 
Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991)).  Additionally, the court admitted 
several paragraphs later that just because “the government may constitutionally 
impose content-based restrictions on speech in nonpublic fora does not insulate a 
regulation from an unbridled discretion challenge.”  Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1324 (citing 
Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. at 764). 
 290. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (citing 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)) (reaffirming that a system of prior 
restraint does not violate the First Amendment only when:  (1) the burden of 
instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the material is unprotected is on 
the censor; (2) the prior restraint is imposed for a specified and limited period of 
time, and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo; and (3) there will be a 
prompt final judicial determination). 
 291. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (listing the elements of each 
standard); Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards:  Prior 
Restraint, Due Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 230-32 (2006) (recounting the rise and fall of prior restraint 
safeguards and explaining the Court’s limitation of the Freedman test). 
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unprotected.292  The statute’s language provides for none of these 
three safeguards.  Instead, the Act vests unbridled discretion in the 
cemetery superintendent or director without any mention of time 
restraints or judicial review.293  As such, the Court should deem 
RAFHA unconstitutional. 
If the Court instead found that RAFHA is content neutral, it likely 
still would find that it does not provide the minimum criteria 
required of a valid prior restraint provision.  The first of two required 
safeguards in a content-neutral regulation is that it provides sufficient 
standards to guide an official’s decision.294  Explicit limits on officials’ 
discretion is one key to preventing censorship.295  Here, RAFHA vests 
unlimited discretion in public officials.  The language of the statute 
prohibits all demonstrations unless the cemetery superintendent or 
director has approved it, but provides no guidelines for which 
demonstrations may be excepted from the Act’s restrictions.296  The 
second safeguard required to prevent abuse of official discretion is 
standards rendering the prior restraint subject to judicial review.297  
Again, RAFHA contains no such standards and thus fails the Supreme 
Court’s established test. 
The Act’s sponsors relied heavily on the language in Griffin to 
convince Congress of its constitutionality.298  There, the circuit court 
                                                          
 292. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321-23 (2002) (finding the 
three Freedman procedural safeguards inapplicable in that case, which involved a 
permit requirement for various park activities, because the activities did not raise the 
same concerns about potential censorship as in Freedman). 
 293. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1) (West 2006). 
 294. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322-23 (holding that content-neutral regulations are 
not held to the three, strict Freedman safeguards, but must still provide sufficient 
standards to guide officials’ decisions and render it subject to judicial review). 
 295. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-70 (1988) 
(explaining that an assertion by the government that officials only deny permits for 
certain legitimate reasons is insufficient where the text of the law lacks explicit 
standards). 
 296. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1). 
 297. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (finding that prior restraint standards in a 
content-neutral regulation must render it subject to judicial review). 
 298. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Steve Chabot) (asserting that the Act is constitutional in light of Griffin v. Sec’y of 
Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  One Congressman mistakenly 
asserted that the Supreme Court had decided Griffin, while it was actually a circuit 
court.  See 152 CONG. REC. H2201 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Silvestre 
Reyes) (“In Griffin . . ., the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of existing regulations that prohibit demonstrations on property under the control 
of the National Cemetery Administration.”).  In fact, he claimed the Court held that 
“[a]ll visitors are expected to observe proper standards of decorum and decency 
while on VA property.  Toward this end, any . . . demonstration except as authorized 
by the head of the facility . . . is prohibited.”  See id.  However, the circuit court was 
simply quoting this language from the statute under analysis.  Griffin, 288 F.3d at 
1315 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(14) (2001)). 
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upheld the standardless prior restraint provision for two reasons.  
First, asserting that the cemetery was a nonpublic forum and that the 
presumption of unconstitutionality is weaker in a nonpublic forum 
than in a public forum, the court found that the statute adequately 
rebutted the lower standard.299  Second, relying on this conclusion as 
well as the nonpublic nature and function of cemeteries, the court 
found the superintendent’s discretion reasonable.300  However, the 
court mistakenly based this conclusion on the mere fact that a forum 
analysis is required in analyzing the constitutionality of speech 
restrictions.301  The court confused the prior restraint doctrine for a 
piece of the forum analysis, which identifies the level of scrutiny to be 
used.  Prior restraint, however, is indeed a separate, facial 
challenge.302  In fact, the Supreme Court has concluded that such a 
facial challenge is allowed “whenever” a government official has 
unbridled discretion under a law, but did not distinguish between 
public and nonpublic fora.303  In Warner, the district court held that 
the regulation fit perfectly within this definition and, applying the 
two-part test described above, found it unconstitutional.304  Because 
Griffin was an erroneous application of the prior restraint doctrine, 
the Court should instead follow the analysis in Warner and find the 
Act facially unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
No one has yet challenged RAFHA’s constitutionality, although 
several local ACLU chapters have tested similar state laws.  Should 
some group or individual take on RAFHA, the Supreme Court likely 
would find the statute unconstitutional. 
To begin, the Act is content based.  Not only was Congress’s 
conception of the Act biased, but its enforcement is unfair, too.  Even 
though most Americans would probably agree that the speech here is 
despicable and insulting, it is nonetheless protected under the First 
                                                          
 299. See Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1322-23 (finding that no Supreme Court case has 
applied the prior restraint doctrine to a nonpublic forum, and that the forum is an 
important factor in analyzing the constitutionality of a speech restriction). 
 300. See id. at 1324-25 (reasoning that a cemetery’s commemorative and expressive 
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 301. See id. at 1323 (discussing the standard of analysis for restrictions in 
nonpublic fora). 
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(identifying the prior restraint doctrine as a facial challenge under the First 
Amendment). 
 303. Id. (defining the doctrine’s scope) (emphasis added). 
 304. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1292-93 (1999) 
(holding that, under Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., the regulation was subject to the facial 
challenge, but could not survive). 
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Amendment.  As such, RAFHA is subject to strict scrutiny, but cannot 
meet that high standard because it is not the least restrictive means 
for achieving a compelling and narrowly tailored governmental 
interest. 
Even if the Court instead finds the Act to be content neutral, it 
could not meet the intermediate scrutiny standard.  RAFHA, 
although it may further a significant governmental interest, is not 
narrowly tailored.  There are already statutes in place to serve the 
government’s interest in protecting the character of cemeteries, and 
the Act here essentially bans demonstrations during most, if not all, 
visiting hours at Arlington National Cemetery.  Moreover, it does not 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 
Finally, RAFHA provides for standardless prior restraint.  It vests in 
one individual the authority to decide who may demonstrate on 
cemetery property and who may not.  However, without designated 
reasons for allowing demonstrations, the cemetery official may pick 
and choose arbitrarily, which likely would result in censoring certain 
viewpoints. 
Our soldiers did not sacrifice their lives in the fight for democracy 
just to have the most important of all democratic rights, the freedom 
of speech, ignored in their honor.  If we seek to honor America’s 
fallen heroes, then we must do so by permitting speech—respectful 
or otherwise—even when it may be hardest to hear. 
 
